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ABSTRACT	  
FOREIGN	  DEBT	  AND	  ECONOMIC	  DEVELOPMENT:	  	  
AN	  ANALYSIS	  OF	  FINANCIAL	  INSTABILITY	  IN	  DEVELOPING	  ECONOMIES	  	  
(August	  2012)	  
	  
Matthew	  Clay	  Holloway,	  B.A.,	  Appalachian	  State	  University	  
M.A.,	  Appalachian	  State	  University	  
Chairperson:	  Jari	  Eloranta	  
	   The	  recent	  disruptions	  within	  the	  global	  financial	  system	  have	  led	  to	  a	  
notable	  reassessment	  of	  heterodox	  economic	  theories	  in	  hope	  that	  their	  unique	  
insights	  into	  the	  capitalist	  business	  cycle	  can	  help	  illuminate	  the	  underlying	  
instabilities	  that	  may	  have	  contributed	  to	  recent	  crises.	  This	  paper	  focuses	  in	  
particular	  on	  the	  work	  of	  noted	  post-­‐Keynesian	  economist	  Hyman	  P.	  Minsky	  and	  his	  
associated	  theories	  of	  financial	  fragility	  and	  the	  inherent	  instability	  of	  modern	  
financial	  capitalism.	  This	  thesis	  will	  emphasize	  the	  theoretical	  foundations	  of	  
Minsky’s	  work,	  notably	  his	  financial	  instability	  hypothesis,	  and	  then	  apply	  this	  
conceptual	  framework	  to	  the	  recent	  Asian	  financial	  crisis	  of	  1997-­‐98.	  This	  analysis	  
is	  supported	  by	  a	  quantitative	  overview	  of	  both	  domestic	  and	  international	  
economic	  data	  primarily	  focusing	  on	  the	  variables	  commonly	  attributed	  to	  Minskian	  
financial	  fragility;	  primarily	  capital	  investment,	  asset	  prices,	  and	  credit	  expansion.	  
Careful	  examination	  of	  these	  factors	  leads	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  Asian	  financial	  
crisis	  was	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  Minsky’s	  financial	  instability	  hypothesis.	  Emerging	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economies	  in	  East	  Asia	  were	  consumed	  in	  a	  mania	  of	  debt	  financed	  over-­‐investment	  
and	  asset	  speculation,	  increasingly	  funded	  via	  foreign	  capital	  through	  loans	  from	  
international	  commercial	  banks.	  Consequently,	  these	  respective	  economies	  were	  
accumulating	  distressing	  levels	  of	  financial	  fragility	  underneath	  their	  much-­‐
applauded	  veneers	  of	  perpetual	  growth	  and	  wealth	  accumulation.	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I.	  INTRODUCTION	  
The	  widespread	  turmoil	  inflicted	  upon	  the	  global	  economy	  over	  recent	  years	  
by	  the	  convulsions	  of	  the	  financial	  system	  has	  prompted	  the	  reappraisal	  of	  economic	  
thought	  previously	  relegated	  to	  the	  fringes	  of	  the	  academic	  and	  financial	  
communities.	  This	  thesis	  examines	  the	  theories	  and	  potential	  applications	  of	  one	  
such	  economist,	  Hyman	  P.	  Minsky,	  who	  argued	  that	  economic	  stability	  is	  inherently	  
destabilizing	  due	  to	  its	  effects	  on	  both	  the	  level	  of	  private	  investment,	  leading	  to	  
overleveraging,	  and	  the	  gradual	  undermining	  of	  associated	  capital	  structures.	  
Minsky’s	  work,	  termed	  the	  financial	  instability	  hypothesis,	  provides	  a	  thought	  
provoking	  and	  timely	  theoretical	  framework	  for	  examining	  the	  recent	  bout	  of	  
financial	  crises	  that	  have	  plagued	  the	  global	  economy.	  Specifically,	  this	  thesis	  applies	  
Minsky’s	  financial	  instability	  hypothesis	  to	  the	  Asian	  financial	  crisis	  of	  1997-­‐98,	  and	  
argues	  that	  it	  was	  largely	  investment-­‐driven	  growth,	  financed	  through	  increasingly	  
speculative	  methods,	  that	  led	  to	  the	  accumulated	  economic	  fragility	  that	  would	  be	  
the	  downfall	  of	  the	  high-­‐flying	  economies	  of	  East	  Asia.	  
	   Hyman	  Minsky	  developed	  his	  financial	  instability	  hypothesis	  as	  an	  adaptation	  
of	  the	  investment-­‐driven	  business	  cycle	  put	  forward	  by	  John	  Maynard	  Keynes	  in	  his	  
seminal	  work,	  The	  General	  Theory	  of	  Employment,	  Interest,	  and	  Money,	  published	  in	  
1936	  after	  Keynes	  witnessed	  the	  truly	  unprecedented	  scale	  of	  global	  economic	  
devastation	  wrought	  during	  the	  Great	  Depression.	  Minsky	  argued	  that	  Keynes’
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theory,	  while	  far	  superior	  to	  the	  classical	  paradigm	  that	  preceded	  it,	  was	  
fundamentally	  flawed	  because	  it	  did	  not	  properly	  account	  for	  the	  development	  of	  
the	  capital	  structure	  that	  supported	  the	  investment	  cycle,	  and	  therefore	  could	  not	  
adequately	  explain	  the	  potentially	  destabilizing	  role	  of	  finance	  in	  the	  business	  cycle.	  
To	  address	  this	  weakness	  Minsky	  first	  bolstered	  the	  Keynesian	  business	  cycle	  by	  
incorporating	  Michael	  Kalecki’s	  profit	  equation,	  derived	  from	  a	  heterodox	  
accounting	  of	  macroeconomic	  stocks	  and	  flows,	  and	  then	  integrated	  this	  more	  
comprehensive	  theory	  of	  business	  investment	  with	  a	  deep	  understanding	  of	  the	  
inner	  workings	  of	  the	  modern	  financial	  system.	  It	  is	  this	  comprehensive	  framework	  
that	  will	  be	  used	  to	  analyze	  both	  the	  domestic	  and	  international	  sources	  of	  economic	  
instability	  that	  were	  building	  within	  the	  seemingly	  unrelenting	  expansion	  of	  the	  
East	  Asian	  economies	  during	  the	  early-­‐to-­‐mid	  nineties.	  	  
	   To	  provide	  empirical	  support	  for	  this	  theory,	  a	  quantitative	  overview	  of	  both	  
domestic	  and	  international	  economic	  data	  will	  be	  used	  to	  examine	  the	  development	  
of	  financial	  instability	  that	  provides	  the	  backbone	  of	  a	  Minskian	  framework.	  
National	  statistics	  on	  asset	  prices,	  capital	  investment,	  credit	  expansion,	  and	  other	  
important	  variables	  of	  economic	  growth	  will	  be	  used	  to	  illustrate	  the	  tenuous	  nature	  
of	  the	  respective	  expansions	  of	  the	  highlighted	  East	  Asian	  economies	  during	  the	  
1990s.	  It	  is	  also	  noteworthy	  that	  analysis	  of	  the	  Asian	  financial	  crisis	  provides	  an	  
opportunity	  to	  utilize	  Minsky’s	  theory,	  which	  has	  largely	  been	  constrained	  to	  the	  
study	  of	  national	  economies,	  on	  an	  international	  scale.	  This	  is	  primarily	  due	  to	  the	  
fact	  that	  a	  principal	  source	  of	  fragility	  within	  many	  of	  the	  East	  Asian	  economies	  was	  
their	  growing	  dependence	  on	  foreign-­‐denominated	  debt	  to	  finance	  their	  domestic	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spending	  and	  investment.	  Therefore,	  relevant	  balance	  of	  payments	  data	  for	  each	  
nation	  will	  also	  be	  incorporated	  into	  the	  final	  analysis.	  	  
	   Careful	  analysis	  of	  this	  data	  bolsters	  Hyman	  Minsky’s	  core	  argument	  that	  
modern	  capitalist	  economies,	  i.e.	  those	  that	  have	  developed	  and	  matured	  in	  the	  
post-­‐WWII	  period,	  do	  trend	  toward	  economic	  instability	  due	  to	  the	  confluence	  of	  the	  
aforementioned	  factors	  that	  Minsky	  described	  in	  his	  financial	  instability	  hypothesis.	  
All	  of	  the	  East	  Asian	  economies	  that	  suffered	  the	  deepest	  downturns	  during	  the	  
crisis	  (Thailand,	  Indonesia,	  South	  Korea,	  Malaysia,	  and	  the	  Philippines)	  exhibited	  
the	  highest	  levels	  of	  Minskian	  financial	  instability	  in	  the	  region.	  The	  progression	  of	  
these	  downturns,	  i.e.	  capital	  flight,	  plummeting	  asset	  prices,	  large-­‐scale	  defaults,	  and	  
massive	  currency	  devaluations,	  also	  exhibit	  the	  features	  that	  are	  expected	  from	  a	  
Minskian	  crisis.	  Still,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  structural	  causes	  of	  financial	  
crises	  like	  the	  one	  that	  engulfed	  East	  Asia	  are	  hotly	  debated,	  with	  many	  prominent	  
theories	  offered	  by	  the	  various	  schools	  of	  economic	  thought.	  
	  
Competing	  Theories	  
	   Due	  to	  the	  recent	  economic	  crises	  that	  have	  afflicted	  the	  developed	  world	  a	  
plethora	  of	  new	  research	  and	  scholarship	  has	  appeared	  focusing	  on	  the	  history	  and	  
underlying	  causes	  of	  bubbles	  and	  busts.	  Often	  these	  new	  perspectives	  are	  linked	  to	  
the	  ongoing	  debate	  over	  the	  recent	  collapse	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  Great	  Moderation.	  	  The	  
almost	   two-­‐decade	   period	   beginning	   in	   the	   early	   1980s	  when	   economic	   volatility	  
decreased	  substantially	  and	  steady,	  low-­‐inflation	  growth	  was	  the	  norm	  has	  come	  to	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a	  jarring	  end.	  As	  a	  consequence	  macroeconomics	  as	  a	  whole	  is	  currently	  in	  a	  state	  of	  
turbulence,	   as	   the	  post-­‐synthesis	  paradigm	  of	  Keynesian	  and	  Neoclassical	  maxims	  
appears	  to	  no	  longer	  offer	  obvious	  solutions	  to	  modern	  economic	  problems.1	  	  
	   The	  underlying	  causes	  of	  the	  current	  lingering	  financial	  and	  economic	  crises	  
are	   fiercely	   debated	   within	   both	   academic	   and	   political	   circles.	   Some	   prominent	  
economists,	  such	  as	  Carmen	  Reinhart	  and	  Kenneth	  Rogoff,	  have	  become	  highly	  vocal	  
about	   the	   role	   of	   government	   debt	   in	   both	   triggering	   financial	   crises	   and	  
lengthening	  their	  duration	  due	  to	  the	  dynamics	  of	  debt	  deleveraging.	  In	  particular,	  
they	   have	   argued	   that	   once	   a	   government	   passes	   the	   90	   percent	   debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	  
threshold	   it	   enters	   a	   kind	   of	   economic	   no-­‐man’s-­‐land,	   a	   period	   characterized	   by	  
rising	   interest	   rates,	   heightened	   volatility,	   prolonged	   unemployment,	   and	  
substandard	   growth.	   2 	  	   This	   argument	   has	   been	   reinforced	   by	   the	   spiraling	  
sovereign	  debt	  crisis	  that	  has	  tormented	  the	  European	  Monetary	  Union	  (EMU).	  The	  
heavily	   indebted	   nations	   of	   Greece,	   Ireland,	   and	   Portugal	   have	   all	   ceded	   large	  
sections	   of	   their	   fiscal	   sovereignty	   in	   order	   to	   attain	   bailout	   funds	   from	   both	   the	  
European	   Union	   (EU)	   and	   the	   International	   Monetary	   Fund	   (IMF)	   after	   being	  
effectively	   locked	   out	   of	   the	   bond	   market	   due	   to	   soaring	   interest	   rates	   on	   their	  
government	   debt.	   These	   events	   have	   helped	   solidify	   a	   growing	   consensus	   against	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For heterodox alternatives see Steven Kates, ed., Macroeconomic Theory and Its Failings: 
Alternative Perspectives on the Global Financial Crisis (Northampton, Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2010), For a critique of neoclassical theory and institutional alternatives, see Douglass North, 
“Cliometrics - 40 Years Later,” The American Economic Review 87 (1997): 412-414, and Avner 
Greif, “Cliometrics After 40 Years,” The American Economic Review 87 (1997): 400-403. 
2 Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial 
Folly, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). See also Reinhart and Rogoff,  “The 
Forgotten History of Domestic Debt,” The Economic Journal 121 (2011): 319-350.	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rising	   levels	   of	   government	   debt	   and	   are	   viewed	   as	   clear	   evidence	   in	   support	   of	  
Reinhart	  and	  Rogoff’s	  argument.	  
	   Nevertheless,	   there	   have	   been	   numerous	   critiques	   of	   this	   rather	   obsessive	  
focus	   on	   the	   detrimental	   role	   that	   growing	   levels	   of	   government	   debt	   play	   in	  
economic	   crises.	   Post-­‐Keynesians,	  many	  working	   under	   the	   framework	  developed	  
by	  Minsky,	  frequently	  criticize	  Reinhart	  and	  Rogoff	  for	  the	  lack	  of	  differentiation	  in	  
their	  arguments.	  They	  posit	   that	  you	  cannot	  aggregate	  all	   sovereign	  debt	   together	  
and	   form	   such	   broad	   and	   nonspecific	   conclusions.	   Particularly,	   they	   note	   that	  
governments	   that	   have	   suffered	   through	   sovereign	   debt	   crises	   tended	   to	   have	   at	  
least	   one	   of	   the	   following	   characteristics;	   large	   debts	   denominated	   in	   foreign	  
currency,	   a	   fixed	   exchange	   rate	   (including	   adhering	   to	   a	   commodity-­‐backed	  
standard),	   or	   membership	   within	   a	   currency	   union.	   In	   all	   of	   these	   cases	   the	  
respective	  governments	  were	  not	  “monetary	  and	  fiscal	  sovereigns,”	  i.e.	  they	  did	  not	  
have	   fully	  domestic	   control	   over	   their	   fiscal	   and	  monetary	  policy.	  3	  Therefore,	   it	   is	  
misguided	   to	   strictly	   compare	   their	   subsequent	   fiscal	   problems	  with	   nations	  who	  
maintain	  such	  sovereignty.	  The	  combination	  of	  relatively	  high	  levels	  of	  government	  
debt	   and	   historically	   low	   interest	   rates	   seen	   in	   countries	   like	   Japan,	   the	   United	  
Kingdom,	  and	   the	  United	  States	  provide	  cogent	  support	   for	   this	  argument,	  as	   they	  
are	  highly	  antithetical	  to	  Reinhart	  and	  Rogoff’s	  general	  thesis.4	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See Yeva Nersisyan and L. Randall Wray, “Does Excessive Sovereign Debt Really Hurt 
Growth? A Critique of This Time Is Different, by Reinhart and Rogoff,” Jerome Levy Economics 
Institute of Bard College, Paper 603 (2010). 
4 For an in-depth analysis of the difference between sovereign and non-sovereign currency see L. 
Randall Wray, Understanding Modern Money: The Key to Full Employment and Price Stability, 
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1998).  
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A	   more	   internationalist	   approach	   to	   financial	   crises	   that	   has	   become	  
increasingly	   popular	   in	   recent	   years	   centers	   on	   the	   concept	   of	   global	   imbalances,	  
primarily	   within	   trade	   and	   capital	   flows,	   and	   their	   distorting	   effects	   on	   domestic	  
economies.5	  Ben	   Bernanke	   famously	   advocated	   for	   this	   theory	   in	   a	   2005	   speech	  
where	  the	  future	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  coined	  the	  term	  “global	  savings	  
glut”	   (GSG).6	  Bernanke	   argued	   that	   excessive	   net	   savings	   in	   emerging	   markets	  
(mainly	   China	   and	   the	   oil	   exporting	   nations)	  were	   flowing	   into	   the	   United	   States	  
bond	  market,	  artificially	  suppressing	  interest	  rates	  and	  helping	  to	  fuel	  asset	  prices	  
through	  the	  expansion	  of	  cheap	  credit,	   largely	   in	   the	   form	  of	  subprime	  mortgages.	  
These	  financial	  flows	  also	  augmented	  the	  growing	  demand	  for	  seemingly	  “riskless”	  
AAA	   investments,	   a	   need	   that	   was	   satisfied	   by	   the	   rise	   of	   mortgage-­‐backed	  
securities.7	  With	  this	  framework	  Bernanke	  tied	  together	  global	  capital	  flows,	  the	  rise	  
of	   structured	   finance,	   and	   the	   resulting	   asset	   price	   speculation	   in	   the	   US	   housing	  
market.	  	  
Popular	  economic	  historian	  Niall	  Ferguson	   further	   reinforced	   this	  model	   in	  
his	   2008	   book	  The	  Ascent	   of	  Money	  with	   his	   introduction	   of	   “Chimerica”	   into	   the	  
economic	  vernacular.	  Ferguson	  presented	  America’s	  debt-­‐driven	  consumption	  and	  
the	  Chinese	  desire	  to	  accumulate	   foreign	  exchange	  reserves	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  symbiotic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 For an example of the widespread adoption of the “global savings glut” see “The great thrift 
shift,” The Economist, September 22, 2005. 
6 For details of the original text of the speech see Ben Bernanke, “The Global Saving Glut and the 
U.S. Current Account Deficit” (speech, Sandridge Lecture to the Virginia Association of 
Economists in Richmond, Virginia, March 10, 2005). 
7 After becoming Fed Chairman Bernanke further developed his theory in B. Bernanke, C. 
Bertaut, L.P. Demarco, and S. Kamin, “International Capital Flows and the Returns to Safe 
Assets in the United States, 2003-2007,” International Financial Discussion Papers, Number 
1014, (2011). 
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relationship	  that	  formed	  between	  the	  world’s	   largest	  debtor	  and	  creditor	  nations.8	  
Americans,	  in	  Ferguson’s	  view,	  were	  able	  to	  maintain	  their	  abnormally	  high	  levels	  of	  
consumption	   through	   a	   combination	   of	   increased	   consumer	   debt	   and	   artificially	  
cheap	  Chinese	  imports.	  The	  Chinese	  benefitted	  by	  subsidizing	  their	  labor-­‐intensive	  
coastal	  export	  industry	  while	  also	  accumulating	  the	  foreign	  exchange	  reserves	  that	  
the	   developing	   world	   covets	   after	   the	   financial	   crises	   of	   East	   Asia,	   Russia,	   and	  
Argentina	   in	   the	   late	   1990s.	   Ferguson	   further	   argues	   that	   the	   situation	   is	  
fundamentally	  unsustainable	  and	  is	  likely	  to	  end	  in	  yet	  another	  financial	  crisis.9	  	  	  	  
This	  GSG	   theory	  of	   financial	   crisis	   has	  been	   severely	   criticized	   in	   the	   years	  
since	   Ben	   Bernanke’s	   original	   speech.	   Harvard	   economists	   David	   Laibson	   and	  
Johanna	   Mollerstrom	   illustrated	   in	   a	   2010	   paper	   for	   the	   National	   Bureau	   of	  
Economic	  Research	  (NBER)	  that	  global	  savings	  rates	  did	  not	  exhibit	  the	  robust	  rise	  
one	  would	  expect	  if	  there	  were	  truly	  a	  global	  glut.10	  They	  also	  argue	  that	  America’s	  
twin	  bubbles	  in	  housing	  and	  consumption	  were	  not	  indicative	  of	  a	  global	  excess	  of	  
savings,	  which	  should	  have	  manifested	  itself	  as	  an	  investment	  boom	  in	  the	  recipient	  
countries	   (as	  was	   the	  case	   in	  East	  Asia	  during	   the	  1990s).	  Further	  criticism	  of	   the	  
GSG	   can	   be	   found	   in	   an	   influential	   paper	   from	   researchers	   at	   the	   Bank	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 For Ferguson’s initial writings on “Chimerica” see Episode 6 in Niall Ferguson, The Ascent of 
Money: A Financial History of the World (New York: Penguin Press, 2008). This was later 
expanded upon in Niall Ferguson and M. Schularick, “The End of Chimerica,” International 
Finance 14:1 (2011): 1-26. 
9 Niall Ferguson, “The End of Chimerica: Amicable Divorce or Currency War?” Testimony to 
United States House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, Washington, DC, 
March 24, 2010. 
10 David Laibson and Johanna Mollerstrom, “Capital Flows, Consumption Booms and Asset 
Bubbles: A Behavioral Alternative to the Savings Glut Hypothesis,” National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Working Paper No. 15759 (2010). 
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International	   Settlements	   (BIS)	   published	   in	   2011.11	  The	   researchers	   note	   that	  
financial	  flows	  have	  come	  to	  dwarf	  the	  current	  account	  movement	  of	  real	  goods	  and	  
services.	  For	  example,	   they	  state	  that	   in	  2010	  gross	  financial	   inflows	  to	  the	  United	  
States	  were	  sixty	  times	  the	  size	  of	  the	  current	  account	  deficit.	  The	  authors	  argue	  that	  
it	  was	   the	   international	   banking	   system,	  mainly	   large	  U.S.	   and	   European	   financial	  
institutions,	   that	   drove	   asset	   price	   speculation	   throughout	   the	   developed	   world	  
through	   the	   process	   of	   endogenous	   credit	   creation	   and	   excessive	   leverage.	   This	  
reformulation	   of	   Bernanke’s	   “global	   savings	   glut”	   has	   been	   termed	   the	   “global	  
banking	  glut,”	  and	  finds	  ultimate	  culpability	   in	  the	  rise	  of	  cross-­‐border	  speculative	  
lending	  as	  opposed	  to	  developing	  world	  excess	  saving.12	  
Another	  theory	  of	  financial	  crisis	  that	  has	  received	  growing	  interest	  in	  recent	  
years	  is	  the	  concept	  that	  income	  and	  wealth	  inequality	  foster	  economic	  fragility	  and	  
lead	  to	  recurrent	  crises.	  This	  argument	  was	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  2010	  book,	  Fault	  Lines:	  
How	   Hidden	   Fractures	   Still	   Threaten	   the	   World	   Economy,	   by	   Raghuram	   Rajan,	   a	  
professor	   of	   economics	   at	   the	   University	   of	   Chicago’s	   Booth	   School	   of	   Business.	  
Rajan	   argued	   that	   a	   confluence	   of	   political	   and	   socioeconomic	   factors	   such	   as	  
unequal	   access	   to	   education,	   the	  weakened	   state	   of	   labor	   unions,	   and	   skewed	   tax	  
policy	   benefitting	   corporations	   and	   the	   wealthy,	   have	   led	   to	   the	   stagnation	   of	  
working-­‐class	   wages	   in	   America	   over	   the	   past	   three	   decades.13	  Meanwhile,	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Claudio Borio and Piti Disyatat, “Global imbalances and the financial crisis: Link or no link?” 
Bank of International Settlements, Working Paper No. 346 (2011). 
12 For more details on the concept of a “global banking glut” see Hyun Song Shin, “Global 
savings glut or global banking glut?” VoxEU, http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/7446. 
13 Raghuram Rajan, Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010). 
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wages	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  income	  pyramid	  have	  soared,	  creating	  an	  increasingly	  large	  
gap	  between	  the	  potential	  consumption	  levels	  of	  the	  two	  groups.	  According	  to	  Rajan	  
this	   gap	   was	   filled	   with	   increasingly	   cheap	   and	   easy	   to	   attain	   credit,	   allowing	  
American	  families	  to	  consume	  far	  beyond	  their	  means	  and	  contributing	  to	  both	  the	  
debt	  buildup	  and	  financial	  speculation	  that	  has	  led	  to	  the	  most	  recent	  crises.14	  This	  
trend	  of	  rising	  inequality	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  America,	  as	  other	  scholars	  have	  noted	  that	  
large	   disparities	   in	   wealth	   and	   income	   have	   been	   rising	   across	   most	   developed	  
nations	  over	  the	  past	  four	  decades.15	  	  	  	  
Noble	   Prize	   winning	   economist	   Joseph	   Stiglitz	   has	   also	   argued	   strongly	   in	  
favor	  of	  the	  concept	  that	  inequality	  is	  destabilizing	  and	  inevitably	  leads	  to	  economic	  
stagnation	   and	   political	   turmoil.	   In	   his	   recent	   book,	   The	   Price	   of	   Inequality:	   How	  
Today’s	  Divided	  Society	  Endangers	  Our	  Future,	  Stiglitz	  argues,	  much	   like	  Rajan,	   that	  
wealth	  has	  been	  allowed	  to	  concentrate	  and	  accumulate	  through	  the	  corruption	  of	  
the	  political	  and	  regulatory	  system	  in	  America	  over	  the	  last	  four	  decades.	  He	  notes	  
the	  overarching	   trend	   toward	  unequal	  economic	  and	  political	  opportunity,	  as	  well	  
as	   the	   inefficiency	   and	   waste	   that	   plagues	   an	   economy	   distorted	   by	   captured	  
regulators,	   inequitable	   tax	   policy,	   and	   corporate	   welfare	   purchased	   through	   an	  
increasingly	  monetized	  electoral	  system.	  However,	  Stiglitz’s	  greatest	  concern	  is	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 For more discussion on the role of inequality in financial crises see Michael Kumhof and 
Romain Ranciere, “Inequality, Leverage, and Crises,” International Monetary Fund, Working 
Paper No. WP/10/268 (2010) and M. Azzimonti, E. Francisco, and V. Quadrini, “Financial 
Globalization, Inequality, and the Raising of Public Debt,” Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 
Working Paper No. 12-6 (2012). 
15 For an in-depth analysis of rising global inequality see James K. Galbraith, Inequality and 
Instability: A Study of the World Economy Before the Great Crisis (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), as well as Anthony Atkinson, Thomas Piketty, and Emmanuel Saez, “Top Incomes 
in the Long Run of History,” Journal of Economic Literature 49:1, (2011): 3-71.  
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the	  essential	  social	  contract	  that	  has	  buttressed	  America	  is	  being	  undermined	  by	  the	  
expanding	  inequalities	  of	  wealth	  and	  opportunity;	  a	  stark	  situation	  that	  subverts	  the	  
nation’s	   capacity	   for	   the	   collective	   action	   that	   is	   fundamental	   to	   a	   liberal	  
democracy.16	  	  	  
Economists	  Michael	  Bordo	  and	  Christopher	  Meissner	  have	  recently	  
countered	  this	  thesis	  in	  a	  2012	  paper	  on	  inequality	  and	  financial	  crises.	  The	  authors	  
note	  that	  credit	  booms	  do	  raise	  the	  possibility	  of	  economic	  crisis	  (a	  finding	  
agreeable	  to	  a	  Minskian),	  but	  argue	  that	  their	  empirical	  research	  found	  no	  evidence	  
of	  accelerated	  credit	  expansion	  being	  caused	  by	  rising	  economic	  inequality.17	  
Instead,	  they	  advance	  the	  more	  orthodox	  argument	  that	  low	  interest	  rates	  and	  high	  
levels	  of	  economic	  growth	  are	  the	  two	  best	  indicators	  of	  credit	  expansion.	  They	  
argue	  that	  periods	  of	  low	  and	  stable	  inflation,	  steady	  growth,	  and	  liberalized	  finance	  
give	  rise	  to	  complacency	  among	  borrowers,	  lenders,	  and	  regulators	  that	  allows	  
credit	  to	  expand	  at	  an	  unsustainable	  rate.	  This	  is	  a	  more	  traditional	  “boom	  and	  bust”	  
argument,	  with	  both	  empirical	  and	  theoretical	  roots	  that	  can	  be	  found	  throughout	  
the	  economic	  and	  historical	  literature.18	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Joseph Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality: How Today’s Divided Society Endangers Our Future 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2012). 
17 For a direct counterargument to Rajan’s thesis see Michael Bordo and Christopher Meissner, 
“Does Inequality Lead to a Financial Crisis?” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working 
Paper No. 17896 (2012). 
18 For an analysis of how credit expansion and low interest rates can lead to an economic crisis 
see Moritz Schularick and Alan Taylor, “Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage 
Cycles and Financial Crises, 1870-2008,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working 
Paper No. 15512 (2009), and Barry Eichengreen and Kris Mitchener, “The Great Depression as a 
Credit Boom Gone Wrong,” Bank of International Settlements, Working Paper No. 137 (2003). 
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Minsky	  and	  Kindleberger	  
A	  noted	  scholar	  who	  utilized	  Minsky’s	  theories	  on	  the	  modern	  capitalist	  
business	  cycle	  was	  Charles	  Kindleberger,	  who	  adapted	  a	  distinctly	  Minskian	  
framework	  to	  provide	  the	  theoretical	  foundation	  for	  his	  historical	  account	  of	  
financial	  crises:	  Manias,	  Panics,	  and	  Crashes:	  A	  History	  of	  Financial	  Crises,	  first	  
published	  in	  1978.19	  This	  work	  deserves	  an	  extended	  discussion	  because,	  as	  a	  
historian	  of	  past	  economic	  crises,	  Kindleberger	  shows	  how	  an	  economic	  historian	  
can	  combine	  a	  social	  scientist’s	  eye	  for	  narrative	  with	  economic	  theory	  and	  meld	  the	  
two	  in	  way	  that	  forms	  a	  coherent	  and	  significant	  contribution	  to	  both	  fields.	  
Kindleberger	  emphasized	  the	  instability	  of	  the	  credit	  system,	  the	  preponderance	  of	  
mass	  irrationality	  in	  euphoric	  cycles,	  and	  the	  asymmetry	  of	  information	  between	  
market	  insiders	  and	  outsiders	  as	  key	  factors	  in	  the	  continual	  booms	  and	  busts	  of	  
capitalism.	  But	  like	  Minsky,	  Kindleberger	  found	  the	  most	  culpability	  within	  the	  
banking	  system,	  stating	  in	  Manias,	  Panics,	  and	  Crashes	  that	  “The	  thesis	  of	  this	  book	  is	  
that	  the	  cycle	  of	  manias	  and	  panics	  results	  from	  the	  pro-­‐cyclical	  changes	  in	  the	  
supply	  of	  credit;	  the	  credit	  supply	  increases	  rapidly	  in	  good	  times,	  and	  then	  when	  
economic	  growth	  slackens,	  the	  rate	  of	  growth	  of	  credit	  has	  often	  declined	  sharply.”20	  
Still,	  he	  noted	  that	  credit	  growth	  is	  only	  part	  of	  the	  larger	  cycle	  of	  booms	  and	  busts,	  
a	  dynamic	  process	  that	  he	  outlined	  in	  five	  distinct	  stages.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 For the most recent edition of Kindleberger’s seminal work see Charles Kindleberger and 
Robert Aliber, Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises, 6th Edition (New 
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011). 
20 Kindleberger and Aliber, 12. 
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For	  Kindleberger	  the	  onset	  of	  any	  speculative	  boom	  begins	  with	  an	  initial	  
“displacement.”	  Frequently	  this	  shift	  in	  the	  economic	  landscape	  arises	  through	  the	  
introduction	  of	  a	  new	  and	  disruptive	  technology.	  Kindleberger	  also	  noted	  that	  
financial	  liberalization,	  deregulation,	  and	  innovations	  in	  banking,	  all	  of	  which	  can	  
provide	  greater	  market	  liquidity	  and	  make	  credit	  easier	  to	  attain,	  are	  also	  forms	  of	  
displacement	  and	  can	  initiate	  the	  same	  levels	  of	  speculative	  fervor.	  This	  exogenous	  
shock	  alters	  the	  economic	  outlook	  and	  distorts	  the	  anticipated	  profit	  opportunities	  
of	  private	  firms	  and	  individuals.	  Increasingly	  risky	  forms	  of	  investment	  are	  
rationalized	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  “new	  paradigms,”	  as	  economic	  activity	  ramps	  up	  and	  the	  
investment	  cycle	  fuels	  a	  self-­‐fulfilling	  surge	  of	  production.21	  
	   These	  displacements,	  whether	  they	  represent	  truly	  significant	  economic	  
revolutions	  like	  the	  railroad	  expansion	  and	  the	  tech	  bubble,	  or	  are	  only	  thinly	  veiled	  
mania	  like	  the	  Dutch	  tulip	  bubble,	  all	  trend	  toward	  excess	  and	  speculation	  as	  they	  
develop.	  Rising	  profit	  expectations	  lead	  to	  an	  initial	  burst	  of	  investment	  that	  flows	  
through	  the	  economy	  resulting	  in	  increased	  employment	  and	  growing	  incomes.	  This	  
economic	  expansion	  typically	  results	  in	  higher	  asset	  prices,	  especially	  within	  the	  
sector	  of	  the	  economy	  benefitting	  from	  the	  displacement	  shock.	  Rising	  asset	  prices	  
and	  increasing	  production	  are	  seen	  as	  justification	  of	  the	  original	  displacement	  
thesis.	  They	  serve	  to	  reinforce	  the	  popular	  narrative	  and	  encourage	  increased	  
investment	  and	  speculation.	  This	  “boom”	  stage	  of	  the	  cycle	  is	  notable	  for	  its	  high	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Kindleberger and Aliber, 27. 
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profit	  margins	  and	  fast	  rising	  asset	  prices.	  This	  is	  also	  the	  point	  in	  cycle	  where	  
accelerating	  credit	  expansion	  becomes	  a	  major	  driving	  force.22	  	  	  	  	  
	   As	  the	  boom	  continues	  past	  forays	  of	  speculative	  investment	  are	  rewarded	  
with	  high	  profits	  and	  capital	  gains.	  The	  natural	  extrapolation	  of	  these	  conditions	  
into	  the	  future	  provides	  a	  fertile	  ground	  for	  the	  debt-­‐fueled	  “euphoric”	  stage	  that	  
follows.	  The	  previously	  mentioned	  factors	  create	  an	  environment	  of	  cyclically	  high	  
profits	  for	  businesses	  and	  low	  defaults	  for	  banks;	  a	  perfect	  recipe	  for	  the	  easing	  of	  
credit	  standards	  as	  banks	  compete	  against	  one	  another	  to	  meet	  the	  growing	  demand	  
for	  debt-­‐financed	  investment	  and	  speculation.	  This	  part	  of	  the	  cycle	  is	  typified	  by	  
what	  former	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  Alan	  Greenspan	  famously	  termed	  
“irrational	  exuberance.”23	  	  
Kindleberger	  notes	  that	  this	  stage	  is	  also	  characterized	  by	  what	  Adam	  Smith	  
referred	  to	  as	  “overtrading,”	  or	  leveraged	  speculation	  that	  is	  devoid	  of	  fundamental	  
analysis.24	  Established	  methods	  for	  analyzing	  businesses	  and	  investments	  are	  
discarded	  as	  outdated	  and	  naive.	  An	  air	  of	  “this	  time	  is	  different”	  gradually	  pervades	  
the	  investment	  community.	  Assets	  are	  bought	  solely	  because	  they	  are	  expected	  to	  
rise	  in	  price.	  This	  is	  justified	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  rising	  prices	  are	  all	  that	  speculators	  
have	  known	  during	  the	  recent	  euphoria.	  As	  Kindleberger	  aptly	  states,	  “There	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Kindleberger and Aliber, 29. 
23 For the infamous “Irrational Exuberance Speech” see Alan Greenspan, “The challenge of 
Central Banking in a Democratic Society,” (speech, At the Annual Dinner and Francis Boyer 
Lecture of The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C., 
December 5, 1996.)  
24 Kindleberger and Aliber, 30. 
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nothing	  as	  disturbing	  to	  one’s	  well-­‐being	  and	  judgment	  as	  to	  see	  a	  friend	  get	  rich.”25	  
As	  amateurs	  and	  speculators	  rush	  into	  the	  market	  rational	  banks	  should	  begin	  to	  
rein	  in	  lending,	  however;	  banks	  are	  profit-­‐driven	  firms	  that	  are	  in	  the	  business	  of	  
selling	  debt,	  and	  at	  the	  heights	  of	  euphoria	  that	  business	  is	  good.	  	  	  
	   At	  this	  point	  the	  cycle	  has	  reached	  an	  unsustainable	  mania,	  as	  even	  the	  
easiest	  of	  credit	  conditions	  can	  only	  entice	  so	  many	  buyers,	  while	  vastly	  inflated	  
prices	  tempt	  sellers	  at	  increasingly	  high	  rates.	  Kindleberger	  notes	  that	  the	  
asymmetry	  of	  “insiders	  and	  outsiders”	  plays	  a	  key	  role	  at	  this	  juncture.	  The	  former,	  
benefitting	  from	  insiders	  knowledge	  that	  current	  prices	  are	  unsustainable,	  become	  
increasingly	  anxious	  to	  sell	  and	  monetize	  their	  gains.	  Meanwhile	  the	  latter	  cannot	  
raise	  their	  demand	  enough	  to	  compensate,	  as	  too	  many	  are	  already	  invested	  and	  
debt	  levels	  are	  maximized.	  At	  the	  point	  where	  the	  selling	  of	  insiders	  overwhelms	  the	  
buying	  of	  outsiders	  prices	  begin	  to	  collapse,	  and	  as	  there	  is	  little	  to	  no	  outside	  
demand	  left	  to	  prop	  up	  prices	  the	  collapse	  builds	  upon	  itself.	  This	  is	  the	  “revulsion”	  
stage	  of	  the	  cycle,	  where	  debt-­‐financed	  investors	  who	  were	  betting	  heavily	  on	  rising	  
prices	  are	  forced	  to	  liquidate	  their	  holdings	  at	  any	  price	  to	  cover	  their	  debts.	  Selling	  
begets	  more	  selling	  as	  positions	  are	  liquidated	  and	  asset	  prices	  plunge.26	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   As	  anxiety	  spreads	  the	  price	  increases	  that	  were	  once	  seen	  as	  inevitable	  
morph	  into	  inescapable	  declines	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  both	  businesses	  and	  investors.	  In	  a	  
financial	  panic	  cash	  becomes	  king,	  as	  other	  positions	  are	  liquidated	  plummeting	  
prices	  trigger	  margin	  calls	  and	  additional	  declines.	  Banks	  become	  fearful	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Kindleberger and Aliber, 30. 
26 Kindleberger and Aliber, 32 
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destruction	  that	  rising	  defaults	  will	  surely	  inflict	  on	  their	  inflated	  asset	  books.	  They	  
begin	  to	  call	  in	  loans;	  further	  exacerbating	  the	  forced	  selling	  that	  is	  battering	  prices,	  
while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  restricting	  loans	  to	  even	  the	  most	  creditworthy	  borrowers.	  
Even	  “Main	  Street”	  businesses	  with	  little	  to	  no	  connection	  to	  the	  collapsing	  bubble	  
are	  threatened	  as	  their	  credit	  lines	  are	  withdrawn,	  weakening	  their	  ability	  to	  finance	  
production	  and	  payrolls,	  all	  in	  the	  face	  of	  falling	  demand	  for	  their	  products.	  
Kindleberger	  terms	  this	  the	  “discrediting”	  stage	  of	  the	  cycle.	  The	  previously	  
accepted	  narrative	  of	  the	  euphoric	  boom	  is	  shattered	  by	  the	  ensuing	  crash.	  He	  
argues	  that	  prices	  only	  begin	  to	  stabilize	  when	  either,	  1)	  assets	  become	  so	  cheap	  
that	  businesses	  are	  willing	  to	  sacrifice	  the	  security	  of	  liquidity	  for	  potential	  
investment	  gains,	  2)	  the	  government	  steps	  in	  with	  tremendous	  levels	  of	  counter-­‐
cyclical	  fiscal	  support,	  or	  3)	  a	  lender	  of	  last	  resort,	  generally	  the	  central	  bank,	  
credibly	  promises	  to	  supply	  unlimited	  liquidity	  to	  meet	  the	  rising	  demand	  for	  
cash.27	  	  	  	  	  
Kindleberger	  noted	  that	  this	  model	  of	  economic	  fragility,	  strongly	  patterned	  
after	  Minsky’s	  financial	  instability	  hypothesis,	  was	  reliably	  found	  within	  more	  past	  
bubbles	  and	  speculative	  booms	  than	  any	  other	  model	  of	  financial	  crises.	  Self-­‐
perpetuating	  debt	  cycles	  and	  speculative	  mania	  are	  shown	  to	  have	  a	  long	  and	  
storied	  history	  of	  interdependent	  development.	  From	  Kindleberger’s	  work	  it	  is	  clear	  
that	  the	  factors	  identified	  by	  Minsky	  as	  central	  to	  the	  endogenous	  cyclicality	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Kindleberger and Aliber, 33. 
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business	  cycle	  are	  timeless.28	  The	  blending	  of	  human	  psychology	  with	  an	  in-­‐depth	  
knowledge	  of	  the	  inner	  workings	  of	  the	  financial	  system	  has	  created	  a	  robust	  
theoretical	  framework	  for	  historical	  analysis	  of	  both	  specific	  crises	  and	  the	  longer-­‐
term	  evolution	  of	  capitalism.	  This	  is	  a	  primary	  reason	  why	  modern	  scholars	  are	  still	  
successfully	  applying	  Kindleberger’s	  framework	  to	  current	  crises,	  most	  recently	  the	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 For another excellent example of Kindleberger’s unique form of economic history see Charles 
Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1986). 
29 Barkley Rosser, Marina Rosser, and Mauro Gallegati. “A Minsky-Kindleberger Perspective on 
the Financial Crisis.” Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 46:2 (2012): 449-458.  
30 Yves Rannou, “Banking regulation, behavioral finance and the financial crisis in Europe: 
Looking to the Kindleberger-Minsky paradigm,” Journal of Risk Management in Financial 
Institutions, Vol. 3:3 (2010): 278-295. 
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II.	  A	  MINSKIAN	  FRAMEWORK	  
	   Hyman	  Minsky	  (1916-­‐1996)	  was	  an	  American	  economist	  and	  professor	  
commonly	  associated	  with	  the	  post-­‐Keynesian	  school	  of	  thought.	  He	  is	  most	  widely	  
known	  for	  his	  comprehensive	  theory	  of	  financial	  crises	  in	  modern	  capitalist	  
economies.	  However,	  before	  discussing	  Hyman	  Minsky’s	  broader	  theories	  of	  the	  
capitalist	  business	  cycle	  it	  is	  important	  to	  delve	  into	  his	  distinctly	  heterodox	  views	  
on	  money	  and	  banking,	  as	  they	  played	  an	  outsized	  role	  in	  the	  formulation	  of	  his	  
financial	  instability	  hypothesis.	  As	  Minsky	  stated	  in	  Can	  “It”	  Happen	  Again?,	  “The	  
thesis	  underlying	  this	  book	  is	  that	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  American	  economy	  
requires	  an	  understanding	  of	  how	  the	  financial	  structure	  is	  affected	  by	  and	  affects	  
the	  behavior	  of	  the	  economy	  over	  time.”31	  
Minsky	  adhered	  to	  a	  post-­‐Keynesian	  view	  of	  banking	  and	  credit	  that	  is	  
commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  horizontalism,	  and	  stands	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  
verticalist	  view	  of	  credit	  creation	  that	  dominates	  mainstream	  economics.32	  
Horizontalism	  is	  primarily	  associated	  with	  the	  post-­‐Keynesian	  school	  of	  economics	  
and	  has	  been	  featured	  in	  the	  work	  of	  economists	  such	  as	  Basil	  Moore,	  Joan	  Robinson,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Hyman Minsky, Can “It” Happen Again? Essays on Instability and Finance (Armonk, N.Y: 
M.E. Sharpe, 1982), 15. 
32 For more information on the history of endogenous money see Basil Moore, Horizontalists and 
Verticalists: The macroeconomics of credit money (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), and Nicholas Kaldor, The Scourge of Monetarism (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1982), and Phillip Arestis and M. Sawyer, eds., A Handbook of Alternative Monetary Economics 
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006).   
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Nicholas	  Kaldor,	  Paul	  Davidson,	  James	  K.	  Galbraith,	  and	  Minsky.33	  The	  theoretical	  
roots	  of	  horizontal	  banking	  are	  found	  in	  the	  earlier	  works	  of	  Knut	  Wicksell,	  Joseph	  
Schumpeter,	  Michael	  Kalecki,	  and	  Keynes.	  	  
These	  economists	  developed	  their	  theories	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  standard	  
model	  of	  credit	  creation	  in	  economics	  which	  holds	  that	  the	  expansion	  and	  
contraction	  of	  the	  money	  supply	  is	  exogenous;	  meaning	  that	  credit	  creation	  is	  
driven	  by	  factors	  outside	  of	  the	  private	  economy,	  namely	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  central	  
bank.	  In	  this	  model	  private	  lending	  is	  restrained	  by	  the	  reserve	  requirement,	  which	  
mandates	  that	  banks	  hold	  a	  certain	  portion	  of	  their	  deposits	  on	  reserve	  at	  the	  
central	  bank.	  These	  deposits	  are	  used	  to	  settle	  interbank	  lending	  and	  are	  the	  
primary	  means	  through	  which	  the	  central	  bank	  conducts	  monetary	  policy	  through	  
the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  federal	  funds	  rate.34	  
The	  fed	  funds	  rate	  is	  the	  standard	  overnight	  lending	  rate	  for	  the	  interbank	  
market	  and	  is	  set	  by	  the	  Federal	  Open	  Market	  Committee	  (FOMC).	  The	  rate	  is	  
maintained	  by	  open	  market	  operations	  (OMOs)	  where	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  buys	  and	  
sells	  treasury	  securities	  to	  adjust	  the	  supply	  of	  reserves	  in	  the	  interbank	  market	  in	  
order	  to	  equalize	  the	  market	  lending	  rate	  with	  the	  Fed’s	  stated	  target	  rate.	  
Consequently,	  the	  aggregate	  level	  of	  reserves	  in	  the	  interbank	  market	  at	  a	  given	  
time	  is	  the	  result	  of	  Federal	  Reserve	  policy,	  with	  the	  Fed	  either	  adding	  (through	  the	  
purchase	  of	  treasuries)	  or	  subtracting	  (through	  the	  selling	  of	  treasuries)	  reserves	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 For an excellent summary of the current state of post-Keynesian economics see, Paul Davidson, 
Post Keynesian Macroeconomic Theory, Second Edition: A Foundation for Successful Economic 
Policies for the Twenty-First Century (Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2011).  
34 For an excellent example of orthodox monetary theory see, Gregory Mankiw, Principles of 
Macroeconomics, 6th Edition (Mason, Ohio: South-Western College, 2011). 
	   19	  
through	  open	  market	  operations	  as	  a	  necessity	  for	  maintaining	  its	  target	  rate	  in	  the	  
federal	  funds	  market.	  It	  is	  primarily	  through	  these	  operations	  that	  standard	  
economic	  theory	  argues	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  is	  able	  to	  control	  bank	  lending,	  and	  
thereby	  adjust	  the	  aggregate	  money	  supply	  to	  complement	  current	  economic	  
conditions.35	  	  
Interbank	  reserves,	  it	  is	  argued,	  directly	  influences	  the	  supply	  of	  credit	  
through	  the	  money	  multiplier.	  According	  to	  standard	  monetarism	  banks	  operating	  
within	  a	  fractional-­‐reserve	  system	  (where	  banks	  are	  required	  to	  only	  hold	  a	  set	  
fraction	  of	  their	  deposits	  on	  reserve)	  are	  able	  to	  leverage	  their	  regulated	  reserves	  in	  
order	  to	  facilitate	  lending.36	  As	  an	  example,	  a	  bank	  operating	  under	  a	  ten	  percent	  
reserve	  requirement	  can	  accept	  a	  $100	  deposit,	  keep	  $10	  on	  reserve	  (either	  as	  vault	  
cash	  or	  on	  deposit	  at	  the	  central	  bank),	  and	  lend	  the	  remaining	  $90	  to	  potential	  
borrowers.	  In	  this	  way	  banks	  are	  said	  to	  “create	  money	  out	  of	  thin	  air.”	  	  
In	  standard	  monetarism	  this	  expansion	  of	  the	  money	  supply	  can	  be	  kept	  in	  
check	  by	  the	  central	  bank,	  which	  can	  sell	  treasury	  securities	  into	  the	  interbank	  
market,	  thereby	  absorbing	  excess	  reserves	  and	  shrinking	  the	  monetary	  base.	  
Because	  of	  the	  reserve	  requirement	  this	  reduction	  in	  the	  monetary	  base	  is	  thought	  
to	  necessarily	  lead	  to	  a	  reduction	  in	  potential	  credit.	  Likewise,	  an	  expansion	  of	  the	  
monetary	  base	  through	  the	  purchasing	  of	  treasury	  securities	  creates	  excess	  reserves	  
in	  the	  interbank	  market	  (often	  analogized	  with	  the	  try	  tinder	  used	  in	  lighting	  a	  fire),	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Mankiw, Part VI. 
36 Mankiw, Part VI. 
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which	  are	  understood	  to	  be	  a	  catalyst	  for	  bank	  lending	  and	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  
money	  supply.37	  	  
	   In	  orthodox	  economics	  banks	  are	  also	  restrained	  from	  lending	  by	  their	  
deposit	  bases.	  Commercial	  banks	  are	  primarily	  funded	  through	  deposits,	  either	  from	  
households,	  businesses,	  or	  other	  financial	  service	  firms.	  The	  remainder	  of	  their	  
financing	  typically	  comes	  from	  the	  issuing	  of	  debt	  (mostly	  through	  short-­‐term	  
borrowing	  in	  the	  money	  markets	  or	  long-­‐term	  borrowing	  through	  corporate	  bonds)	  
and	  their	  equity	  capital	  base.38	  Orthodox	  economics	  argues	  that	  banks	  still	  function	  
in	  a	  way	  recognizable	  to	  their	  ancestors	  from	  the	  era	  of	  commodity-­‐backed	  money.	  
They	  must	  compete	  for	  deposits	  (by	  paying	  competitive	  interest	  rates)	  in	  order	  to	  
then	  lend	  these	  deposits	  out	  to	  businesses	  and	  investors	  at	  a	  market	  lending	  rate.	  
The	  potential	  money	  supply,	  and	  therefore	  the	  availability	  of	  debt-­‐financed	  
investment,	  is	  limited	  by	  the	  available	  stock	  of	  savings.	  This	  is	  the	  standard	  model	  of	  
banks	  as	  intermediaries	  between	  patient	  savers	  with	  excess	  money	  and	  impatient	  
borrowers	  short	  on	  money.39	  	  
	   Minsky	  firmly	  rejected	  this	  neoclassical	  model	  of	  banking,	  viewing	  it	  as	  an	  
antiquated	  relic	  of	  commodity-­‐backed	  money	  that	  utterly	  failed	  to	  adapt	  to	  the	  
evolution	  of	  the	  modern	  financial	  system.	  Specifically,	  he	  argued	  that	  both	  the	  
reserve	  requirement	  and	  the	  deposit	  limit	  were	  not	  the	  essential	  constraints	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Mankiw, Part VIII. 
38 Benton Gup and James Kolari, Commercial Banking: The Management of Risk, 3rd Edition 
(Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2005). 
39 Mankiw, Part V. 
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credit	  expansion	  that	  neoclassical	  economists	  envisioned.40	  First,	  Minsky	  correctly	  
argued	  that	  the	  development	  of	  modern	  central	  banking	  had	  rendered	  the	  reserve	  
requirement	  irrelevant	  in	  terms	  of	  restricting	  credit	  growth.	  He	  noted	  that	  central	  
bank	  policy	  now	  targets	  the	  federal	  funds	  rate	  explicitly,	  instead	  of	  through	  the	  
aggregate	  money	  supply.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  central	  bank	  supplies	  (drains)	  
whatever	  amounts	  of	  reserves	  are	  required	  to	  lower	  (raise)	  the	  interbank	  lending	  
rate	  to	  match	  the	  target	  rate.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  policy	  reserves	  are	  always	  readily	  
available	  within	  the	  interbank	  market	  at	  the	  set	  rate,	  and	  therefore	  do	  no	  inhibit	  
bank	  lending	  in	  the	  manner	  they	  once	  did	  when	  reserves	  were	  held	  in	  gold	  (and	  
thus	  were	  not	  freely	  creatable	  by	  the	  central	  bank).41	  	  	  	   	  
	   Minsky	  also	  rejected	  the	  argument	  that	  banks	  are	  passive	  takers	  of	  deposits,	  
financial	  intermediaries	  offering	  competitive	  rates	  to	  attract	  the	  funding	  they	  need	  
to	  finance	  loans.	  Instead,	  he	  adopted	  the	  post-­‐Keynesian	  view	  that	  bank	  loans	  are	  
self-­‐financed.	  In	  the	  process	  of	  creating	  money	  banks	  issue	  loans	  (assets	  for	  banks,	  
liabilities	  for	  borrowers)	  that	  generate	  offsetting	  deposits	  (liabilities	  for	  banks,	  
assets	  for	  borrowers).42	  If	  these	  deposits	  are	  then	  transferred	  out	  of	  the	  bank,	  
maybe	  to	  purchase	  a	  home	  or	  invest	  in	  a	  factory,	  the	  bank	  can	  fill	  the	  financing	  gap	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Hyman Minsky, “Central Banking and Money Market Changes,” The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 71, No. 2 (1957).   
41 This was recently verified in a 2009 speech by the President of the NY Federal Reserve, 
William Dudley, who stated that, “Based on how monetary policy has been conducted for several 
decades, banks have always had the ability to expand credit whenever they like. They don’t need 
a pile of ‘dry tinder’ in the form off excess reserves to do so. That is because the Federal Reserve 
has committed itself to supply sufficient reserves to keep the fed funds rate at its target.” William 
C. Dudley, “The Economic Outlook and the Fed’s Balance Sheet: The Issues of ‘How’ versus 
‘When’” (speech, at the Association for a Better New York Breakfast Meeting, New York, July 
29, 2009.) 
42 This leads to the famous saying within post-Keynesian economics that “loans create deposits.” 
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through	  the	  interbank	  market	  for	  reserves,	  which	  has	  already	  been	  shown	  to	  supply	  
all	  desired	  reserves	  at	  the	  central	  bank’s	  target	  rate.	  Thus,	  modern	  banks	  are	  not	  
restrained	  from	  issuing	  credit	  by	  the	  neoclassical	  restrictions	  of	  reserve	  
requirements	  and	  deposit	  funding.	  
	   As	  a	  consequence	  the	  money	  supply	  is	  set	  endogenously,	  by	  the	  demands	  of	  
the	  private	  economy	  for	  liquidity,	  business	  working	  capital,	  investment	  finance,	  and	  
so	  forth.	  The	  central	  bank	  anchors	  the	  base	  rate	  of	  money	  through	  the	  fed	  funds	  
market,	  and	  private	  banks	  then	  set	  the	  lending	  rate	  based	  on	  the	  general	  markup	  
needed	  to	  cover	  their	  costs	  of	  operation	  and	  attain	  a	  desired	  return	  on	  equity	  for	  
their	  investors.	  At	  this	  price	  banks	  sell	  their	  product	  on	  the	  market.	  Much	  like	  
automakers	  sell	  cars	  or	  grocery	  stores	  sell	  food;	  banks	  sell	  debt.	  They	  offer	  their	  
goods	  at	  a	  market	  price	  and	  lend	  freely	  to	  creditworthy	  borrowers	  that	  meet	  their	  
internally	  set	  requirements.	  Consequently,	  the	  ultimate	  supply	  of	  credit	  within	  the	  
economy	  is	  determined	  primarily	  by	  the	  lending	  standards	  of	  private	  banks	  and	  the	  
demand	  for	  debt	  from	  households	  and	  firms.	  The	  central	  bank	  can	  affect	  the	  funding	  
costs	  for	  banks,	  and	  subsequently	  raise	  or	  lower	  the	  general	  price	  of	  debt,	  but	  it	  
cannot	  control	  the	  aggregate	  supply.43	  This	  is	  an	  explicit	  refutation	  of	  the	  economic	  
orthodoxy;	  mechanical	  models	  of	  exogenous	  money	  and	  central	  bank	  control	  over	  
credit	  creation	  are	  inoperable	  remnants	  of	  an	  outdated	  concept	  of	  banking	  and	  
finance.	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   Specifically,	  Minsky	  is	  dismissing	  a	  fundamental	  concept	  that	  underlies	  the	  
neoclassical	  theory	  of	  economics,	  the	  argument	  that	  savings	  fund	  investment.	  In	  its	  
place	  he	  is	  adopting	  the	  Keynes/Kalecki	  model	  that	  overturns	  the	  traditional	  line	  of	  
causation,	  arguing	  instead	  that	  the	  private	  investment	  decisions	  of	  capitalists	  are	  
what	  allow	  for	  the	  accumulation	  of	  savings.44	  The	  importance	  of	  this	  reformulation	  
of	  the	  orthodox	  model	  cannot	  be	  overstated.	  By	  arguing	  that	  savings	  arise	  from	  
capitalist	  investment	  Minsky	  is	  casting-­‐off	  the	  fundamental	  underpinnings	  of	  the	  
hypothetical	  loanable	  funds	  market	  that	  dominates	  the	  neoclassical	  models	  
embedded	  within	  orthodox	  monetary	  theory.	  He	  is	  also	  explicitly	  rejecting	  the	  idea	  
of	  an	  elastic	  market	  rate	  of	  interest,	  an	  intermediating	  force	  that	  brings	  passive	  
savings	  into	  equilibrium	  with	  active	  borrowers.	  In	  its	  place	  he	  substitutes	  the	  “cost	  
plus	  markup”	  model	  of	  pricing	  mentioned	  earlier	  that	  banks	  utilize	  to	  sell	  debt,	  
much	  like	  nonfinancial	  firms	  use	  to	  sell	  their	  own	  goods	  and	  services.45	  	  
The	  endogenous	  money	  supply	  is	  a	  critical	  aspect	  of	  Minsky’s	  broader	  theory	  
of	  the	  capitalist	  business	  cycle	  because	  it	  directly	  relates	  to	  the	  outsized	  role	  of	  
financial	  institutions	  in	  modern	  economies.	  Because	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  cannot	  
directly	  control	  the	  expansion	  of	  credit,	  the	  banking	  system	  is	  the	  ultimate	  arbiter	  of	  
money	  within	  the	  economy.46	  As	  previously	  mentioned,	  the	  works	  of	  economic	  
historian	  Charles	  Kindleberger	  have	  shown	  that	  both	  households	  and	  businesses	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Hyman Minsky, “Finance and Profits: The Changing Nature of American Business Cycles,” 
The Business Cycle and Public Policy, 1929-80, Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the 
United States, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. (1980). 
45 Hyman Minsky, “The Financial Instability Hypothesis: A Clarification,” Hyman P. Minsky 
Archive, Paper 145 (1989). 
46 Minsky, “Finance and Profits,” The significance of finance. 
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have	  long	  and	  infamous	  histories	  of	  collective	  bouts	  of	  insanity	  when	  confronted	  
with	  rising	  asset	  prices	  and	  speculative	  investment	  opportunities.	  	  
In	  such	  an	  environment	  strict	  credit	  standards	  and	  prudent	  underwriting	  
combine	  to	  form	  the	  financial	  gatekeeper	  between	  speculative	  profit-­‐seekers	  and	  
the	  latest	  financial	  craze.	  However,	  banks	  are	  in	  the	  business	  of	  making	  money,	  and	  
banks	  make	  money	  primarily	  by	  selling	  debt.	  Additionally,	  the	  historical	  record	  is	  
also	  filled	  with	  overzealous	  bankers,	  urging	  their	  fellow	  capitalists	  forward	  in	  
pursuit	  of	  the	  latest	  paradigm	  shifting	  opportunity.47	  Therefore,	  as	  Minsky	  rightly	  
observes,	  once	  it	  becomes	  apparent	  that	  banks	  are	  able	  to	  endogenously	  expand	  the	  
money	  supply	  to	  meet	  private	  demand,	  it	  also	  becomes	  apparent	  that	  bouts	  of	  
speculation	  are	  always	  at	  risk	  of	  becoming	  self-­‐perpetuating	  manias	  of	  debt-­‐
financed	  overinvestment	  and	  the	  misallocation	  of	  capital.	  	  	  
In	  a	  modern	  capitalist	  banking	  system	  the	  only	  exogenous	  limit	  on	  the	  
cyclical	  expansion	  of	  credit	  that	  Minsky	  acknowledged	  was	  the	  ability	  of	  financial	  
regulators	  to	  limit	  lending	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  regulatory	  capital	  requirements.48	  Banks	  
can	  always	  obtain	  deposits	  and	  reserves	  to	  fund	  their	  assets,	  but	  these	  are	  both	  
liabilities	  on	  bank	  balance	  sheets.	  They	  are	  short	  and	  medium-­‐term	  debts	  that	  
require	  regular	  interest	  payments	  to	  lenders.	  What	  banks	  cannot	  create	  is	  equity	  
capital.	  Like	  all	  firms	  they	  must	  either	  raise	  equity	  in	  the	  markets	  or	  grow	  their	  
capital	  bases	  internally	  though	  retained	  earnings.	  Therefore,	  regulatory	  limits	  on	  
banking	  leverage	  (the	  ratio	  of	  a	  banks	  capital	  base	  to	  its	  total	  assets)	  can	  potentially	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Kindleberger and Aliber, Chapter 4. 
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limit	  the	  ability	  of	  banks	  to	  extend	  credit.	  However,	  as	  Minsky	  frequently	  observed,	  
regulators	  are	  often	  unwilling	  to	  enforce	  strict	  limits	  on	  bank	  leverage.	  Additionally,	  
modern	  banking	  regulations	  allow	  firms	  considerable	  flexibility	  in	  determining	  both	  
their	  asset	  books	  and	  their	  levels	  of	  capital.49	  Thus,	  when	  combined	  with	  the	  opacity	  
of	  today’s	  “shadow	  banking	  system”	  Minsky	  argued	  that	  financial	  institutions	  face	  
minimal	  limits	  on	  their	  ability	  to	  expand	  credit.50	  
	  
The	  Financial	  Instability	  Hypothesis	  
	   Hyman	  Minsky’s	  most	  enduring	  and	  consequential	  work	  focused	  on	  the	  
tendency	  of	  modern	  capitalist	  economies	  toward	  boom	  and	  bust	  cycles	  of	  expansion	  
and	  contraction.	  In	  particular,	  Minsky	  emphasized	  the	  role	  of	  private	  finance	  and	  
debt	  accumulation	  in	  the	  pro-­‐cyclical	  amplifying	  and	  perpetuating	  of	  this	  cycle.	  For	  
Minsky	  the	  neoclassical	  argument	  for	  equilibrium,	  a	  state	  of	  maximum	  output	  and	  
employment,	  was	  a	  myth.	  Moderations	  of	  the	  business	  cycle	  were	  not	  the	  
gravitational	  center	  of	  capitalism,	  constantly	  pulling	  the	  economy	  toward	  its	  
maximal	  state,	  but	  only	  brief	  “periods	  of	  tranquility.”51	  He	  conceptualized	  these	  
ideas	  into	  an	  encompassing	  theory	  of	  economic	  crises	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  financial	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50 Minsky, “Finance and Profits,” The significance of finance. 
51 Hyman Minsky, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 197.  
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instability	  hypothesis	  (FIH),	  Minsky’s	  most	  durable	  and	  renowned	  contribution	  to	  
modern	  economic	  thought.	  52	  
	   Central	  to	  Minsky’s	  theory	  of	  the	  business	  cycle	  is	  the	  “two-­‐price	  system”	  
that	  he	  adopted	  from	  Keynes’	  General	  Theory.53	  He	  argued	  that	  there	  are	  two	  
interrelated	  prices	  that	  determine	  the	  level	  of	  aggregate	  investment	  in	  the	  economy.	  
The	  first	  is	  the	  price	  for	  current	  output.	  This	  is	  a	  supply	  price	  that	  represents	  the	  
current	  price	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  sold	  on	  the	  market.	  Minsky	  stated	  that	  current	  
output	  is	  priced	  on	  a	  “cost	  plus	  markup”	  basis.54	  He	  argued	  that	  since	  all	  capitalist	  
firms	  are	  driven	  by	  the	  profit	  motive	  they	  set	  the	  price	  of	  their	  goods	  relative	  to	  
their	  cost	  structures;	  the	  output	  price	  must	  cover	  the	  cost	  of	  materials,	  labor,	  
overhead,	  and	  debt	  payments.	  The	  magnitude	  of	  markups	  on	  a	  firm-­‐by-­‐firm	  basis	  is	  
often	  the	  result	  of	  market	  power	  (monopoly,	  patents,	  government	  subsidies,	  etc.)	  
and	  microeconomic	  variables	  (advertising,	  product	  quality,	  availability,	  etc.).	  
However,	  in	  the	  aggregate	  the	  markup	  represents	  total	  profits	  available	  to	  the	  
owners	  of	  capital,	  and	  is	  a	  sign	  of	  the	  relative	  power	  of	  labor	  and	  business	  within	  the	  
economy.	  Minsky	  noted	  that	  investment	  goods	  are	  particularly	  important	  when	  
analyzing	  the	  pricing	  of	  output,	  because	  their	  market	  price	  represents	  the	  supply	  
price	  of	  capital.55	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Minsky laid out his financial instability hypothesis in a series of three books, see Hyman 
Minsky, John Maynard Keynes (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), Can “It” Happen 
Again published in 1982, and Stabilizing an Unstable Economy originally published in 1986.    
53 Minsky, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, 194-96. 
54 Minsky, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, 176. 
55 Minsky, John Maynard Keynes, 95. 
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   The	  second	  price	  that	  Minsky	  focused	  on	  was	  the	  price	  of	  assets,	  specifically	  
the	  market	  price	  of	  the	  investable	  assets	  that	  compete	  for	  a	  capitalist’s	  funds.	  All	  of	  
these	  assets	  are	  similar	  in	  that	  they	  promise	  future	  streams	  of	  income	  in	  
compensation	  for	  large	  sums	  of	  upfront	  investment.	  The	  only	  exceptions	  are	  cash	  
and	  cash-­‐like	  securities,	  which	  are	  valued	  for	  their	  safety	  and	  liquidity	  over	  their	  
prospective	  yield.	  All	  other	  investable	  assets,	  from	  bonds,	  to	  equities,	  to	  factories	  
and	  machinery	  are	  priced	  based	  on	  the	  discounted	  value	  of	  their	  future	  income	  
streams.	  Potential	  capital	  gains	  from	  the	  selling	  of	  assets	  also	  factor	  into	  their	  
pricing,	  but	  are	  not	  their	  fundamental	  source	  of	  value.	  Importantly,	  this	  future	  
stream	  of	  income	  is	  necessarily	  uncertain.	  While	  the	  future	  income	  from	  bonds	  is	  
surely	  more	  reliable	  than	  income	  from	  a	  factory,	  both	  are	  dependent	  upon	  future	  
economic	  circumstances	  that	  cannot	  be	  known	  at	  the	  time	  of	  purchase.	  Therefore,	  
an	  important	  component	  of	  the	  pricing	  of	  all	  long-­‐term	  assets	  is	  the	  expectation	  of	  
future	  business	  conditions	  and	  cash	  flows.56	  These	  expectations	  are	  an	  unwieldy	  
mixture	  of,	  among	  other	  things;	  recent	  history,	  current	  newspaper	  headlines,	  and	  
capitalist’s	  best	  guesses	  concerning	  future	  business	  conditions.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   Like	  the	  aforementioned	  supply	  pricing	  of	  output,	  Minsky	  placed	  great	  
importance	  on	  the	  demand	  pricing	  for	  investment	  assets	  in	  particular.	  This	  price	  
represents	  the	  demand	  price	  for	  capital,	  and	  when	  combined	  with	  the	  supply	  price	  
of	  investment	  goods	  it	  forms	  the	  central	  supply	  and	  demand	  relationship	  that	  drives	  
the	  investment	  cycle.	  In	  a	  cash	  or	  barter	  economy	  this	  would	  be	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  
analysis,	  but	  Minsky	  realized	  that	  in	  capitalist	  economies	  both	  the	  supply	  and	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demand	  prices	  need	  to	  incorporate	  the	  financial	  costs	  that	  are	  associated	  with	  the	  
expensive	  and	  long-­‐lived	  assets	  that	  dominate	  modern	  investment.	  	  
	   To	  accomplish	  this	  Minsky	  utilized	  the	  concepts	  of	  “borrower’s	  risk”	  and	  
“lender’s	  risk.”57	  He	  argued	  that	  the	  production	  of	  capital	  goods	  is	  financed	  through	  
the	  banking	  system;	  the	  construction	  of	  fixed	  assets	  is	  financed	  through	  bonds,	  
while	  subsequent	  inventory	  is	  financed	  through	  short-­‐term	  credit	  lines.	  Therefore,	  
the	  supply	  price	  of	  these	  goods	  incorporates	  lender’s	  risk.	  This	  encompasses	  the	  
credit	  terms,	  covenants,	  and	  interest	  rates	  used	  by	  banks	  to	  offset	  the	  risk	  
associated	  with	  their	  lending,	  and	  must	  be	  compensated	  for	  in	  the	  firm’s	  markup	  of	  
investment	  goods	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  its	  profitability.	  The	  purchase	  of	  these	  goods	  
is	  also	  frequently	  financed	  through	  the	  banking	  system,	  and	  consequently	  must	  also	  
be	  adjusted	  for	  financial	  risk,	  in	  this	  case	  referred	  to	  as	  borrower’s	  risk.	  Minsky	  
states	  that	  the	  more	  financing	  a	  buyer	  requires	  the	  lower	  they	  will	  set	  their	  demand	  
price	  for	  investment	  assets.	  The	  lower	  price	  reflects	  the	  buyer’s	  desire	  for	  a	  higher	  
prospective	  rate	  of	  return	  to	  compensate	  the	  firm	  for	  the	  increased	  risk	  of	  financial	  
distress	  that	  accompanies	  a	  larger	  debt	  burden.	  	  	  
	   Both	  lender’s	  risk	  and	  borrower’s	  risk	  are	  included	  within	  the	  larger	  margin	  
of	  safety	  that	  influences	  the	  supply	  and	  demand	  prices	  of	  investment.58	  For	  
suppliers	  the	  margin	  of	  safety	  is	  expanded	  by	  leaner	  operations	  and	  lower	  debt	  
burdens,	  while	  buyers	  increase	  their	  margin	  of	  safety	  through	  lower	  demand	  prices	  
and	  less	  reliance	  on	  debt	  financing.	  Minsky	  notes	  that	  these	  margins	  of	  safety,	  meant	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Minsky, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, 198. 
58 Minsky, John Maynard Keynes, 106-13. 
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to	  provide	  buffers	  against	  the	  business	  cycle,	  in	  reality	  are	  decidedly	  pro-­‐cyclical.	  
Economic	  history	  clearly	  shows	  that	  capitalist’s	  expectations	  of	  prospective	  returns	  
and	  their	  willingness	  to	  leverage	  their	  balance	  sheets	  both	  tend	  to	  reach	  their	  
pinnacle	  at	  the	  peak	  of	  the	  business	  cycle.	  When	  subsequent	  downturns	  have	  
destroyed	  capital,	  lowered	  asset	  prices,	  and	  dramatically	  increased	  the	  potential	  
profitability	  of	  lending	  and	  investment	  capitalists	  are	  often	  timid,	  frequently	  
bemoaning	  the	  uncertain	  business	  environment	  and	  speculating	  that	  another	  
recession	  is	  right	  around	  the	  corner.	  
	   This	  means	  that	  margins	  of	  safety	  are	  at	  their	  widest	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  
business	  cycle.	  Minsky	  noted	  that	  this	  results	  in	  a	  rising	  supply	  cost	  for	  investment	  
goods	  at	  the	  same	  time	  that	  demand	  prices	  for	  investment	  assets	  are	  being	  lowered,	  
resulting	  in	  stagnant	  levels	  of	  investment.	  Therefore,	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  financial	  
crises	  recoveries	  can	  often	  be	  substandard,	  as	  weak	  investment	  holds	  back	  
employment	  and	  places	  downward	  pressure	  on	  wages.	  As	  recovery	  gradually	  does	  
emerge	  margins	  of	  safety	  will	  compress,	  fueling	  investment,	  and	  providing	  a	  
tailwind	  for	  expansion	  as	  current	  profits	  justify	  rising	  expectations	  and	  further	  
investment	  in	  a	  virtuous	  cycle.	  It	  is	  this	  self-­‐fulfilling	  progression	  of	  expanding	  
investment,	  rising	  profits,	  and	  increasing	  expectations	  that	  Minsky	  focused	  on,	  
paying	  particular	  attention	  to	  the	  evolution	  of	  firms’	  capital	  structures	  across	  the	  
cycle.	  	  	  
	  	  	   Through	  the	  financial	  instability	  hypothesis	  Minsky	  related	  private	  finance	  
and	  aggregate	  demand	  through	  the	  impact	  of	  financial	  markets	  on	  business	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investment	  and	  the	  subsequent	  impact	  of	  investment	  on	  incomes,	  money	  flows,	  and	  
asset	  prices.59	  According	  to	  Minsky	  economic	  stability	  is	  inherently	  destabilizing	  
over	  the	  long	  term,	  primarily	  based	  upon	  the	  devaluing	  of	  liquidity,	  the	  easing	  of	  
lending	  standards,	  and	  the	  ensuing	  accumulation	  of	  private	  debt	  in	  order	  to	  support	  
inflated	  asset	  values	  and	  the	  buildup	  on	  increasingly	  expensive	  capital	  stock.	  Profit-­‐
seeking	  firms	  are	  incentivized	  to	  become	  increasingly	  indebted,	  as	  those	  employing	  
liquid	  and	  conservative	  capital	  structures	  are	  tempted	  by	  higher	  prospective	  
returns	  on	  equity	  capital	  and	  the	  potential	  for	  higher	  profit	  margins	  that	  can	  come	  
from	  debt	  financing.	  Liquidity	  is	  devalued	  as	  costly	  long-­‐term	  assets	  are	  financed	  
through	  progressively	  shorter-­‐term	  debt,	  increasing	  the	  possibility	  that	  any	  shock	  to	  
the	  financial	  system	  could	  result	  in	  a	  liquidity	  crisis	  that	  exposes	  underlying	  
structural	  insolvency.60	  	  
As	  Minsky	  noted,	  “A	  capitalist	  economy	  can	  be	  described	  by	  a	  set	  of	  
interrelated	  balance	  sheets	  and	  income	  statements.”61	  Within	  the	  economy	  all	  
economic	  units,	  whether	  they	  be	  businesses,	  households,	  or	  governments,	  take	  
positions	  in	  assets	  that	  are	  financed	  through	  liabilities.	  The	  decision	  to	  finance	  
through	  debt	  rather	  than	  equity	  is	  made	  for	  various	  reasons,	  among	  them	  a	  lack	  of	  
available	  cash,	  the	  presence	  of	  attractive	  interest	  rates,	  preferential	  tax	  treatment,	  
or	  a	  desire	  for	  financial	  engineering	  through	  balance	  sheet	  leveraging.	  However,	  the	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60 Minsky, “The Financial Instability Hypothesis: A Clarification.” 
61 Hyman Minsky, “The Essential Characteristics of Post-Keynesian Economics,” Hyman P. 
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end	  result	  is	  the	  same:	  the	  creation	  of	  money	  obligations	  extending	  far	  into	  an	  
uncertain	  future.	  
	   Minsky	  defined	  the	  dynamic	  process	  of	  private	  debt	  accumulation	  by	  
identifying	  three	  different	  levels	  of	  private	  borrowing	  transactions,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  
respective	  locations	  in	  time	  within	  the	  business	  cycle.	  In	  “hedge”	  transactions	  the	  
borrower	  can	  make	  all	  debt	  payments,	  principal	  and	  interest,	  from	  current	  asset	  
cash	  flows.	  These	  are	  typified	  by	  businesses	  with	  a	  relatively	  large	  percentage	  of	  
equity	  financing	  who	  are	  able	  to	  remain	  solvent	  in	  all	  but	  the	  worst	  market	  
environments.	  “Speculative”	  transactions	  involve	  a	  borrower	  whose	  probable	  cash	  
flows	  can	  cover	  interest	  payments	  but	  is	  not	  able	  to	  fully	  repay	  the	  principal.	  A	  
speculative	  borrower	  needs	  to	  continually	  refinance	  part	  of	  its	  debt	  in	  order	  to	  
avoid	  a	  potentially	  ruinous	  cash	  shortfall.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  in	  Minskian	  
analysis	  all	  financial	  institutions	  are	  fundamentally	  speculative;	  they	  finance	  long-­‐
term	  assets	  largely	  through	  short-­‐term	  borrowings	  that	  must	  be	  continually	  
refinanced	  in	  the	  marketplace.	  Finally,	  “ponzi”	  transactions	  involve	  borrowers	  who	  
cannot	  depend	  on	  asset	  cash	  flows	  to	  fulfill	  either	  interest	  or	  principal	  payments.	  
These	  debtors	  must	  continually	  issue	  new	  debt	  and	  equity,	  or	  sell	  liquid	  marketable	  
assets,	  to	  meet	  their	  obligations.	  Consequently,	  ponzi	  borrowers	  are	  dependent	  on	  
both	  asset	  price	  appreciation	  as	  well	  as	  liquid	  and	  stable	  debt	  markets	  for	  their	  
future	  solvency.62	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In	   a	   Minskian	   analysis	   modern	   capitalism,	   with	   its	   innate	   boom	   and	   bust	  
progression	   and	   profit-­‐seeking	   firms,	   is	   driven	   toward	   a	   more	   unstable	   and	  
leveraged	   capital	   structure	   over	   the	   course	   of	   the	   business	   cycle.	   As	   leverage	  
increases	   the	   size	   of	   the	   shock	   needed	   to	   induce	   a	   financial	   crisis	   declines.	  
Something	   as	   simple	   as	   a	   flattening	   of	   asset	   prices,	   or	   a	  marginal	   rise	   in	   interest	  
rates,	   will	   cause	   the	   ponzi	   borrower	   to	   default.	   At	   this	   point	   Minsky	   identifies	   a	  
chain	   reaction	   that	   spreads	   through	   modern	   financial	   markets.	   Ponzi	   borrowers	  
liquidate	   marketable	   assets	   to	   meet	   obligations,	   this	   magnifies	   the	   downward	  
pressure	  on	  asset	  prices;	  collateral	  previously	  pledged	  by	  other	  borrowers	   is	   then	  
devalued,	   forcing	   further	   selling	   of	   assets	   in	   a	   vicious	   cycle.	   This	   ripple	   of	   forced	  
selling	   and	   liquidation	   spreads	   through	   the	   financial	   system	   causing	   lenders	   and	  
borrowers	   alike	   to	   rush	   for	   liquidity	   and	   safety,	   devaluing	   risk	   assets	   and	  
perpetuating	  a	  series	  of	  margin	  calls	  and	  defaults.63	  	  	  	  	  
Helping	  to	  perpetuate	  this	  cycle	   is	  the	  Keynesian	  idea	  of	  uncertainty,	  which	  
was	   central	   to	   Keynes’	   theory	   of	   the	   business	   cycle	   according	   to	   Minsky,	   who	  
famously	  stated	  that,	  “Keynes	  without	  uncertainty	  in	  something	  like	  hamlet	  without	  
the	  Prince.”64	  Uncertainty	   for	  Keynes,	  and	   for	  Minsky	  as	  well,	  was	  centered	  on	   the	  
idea	  that	  capitalists	  and	  households	  make	  economic	  decisions	  whose	  consequences	  
are	  dependent	  upon	  the	  future	  outcomes	  of	  variables	  that	  those	  individuals	  have	  no	  
reasonable	  chance	  of	  knowing.	  This	  uncertainty	  has	  particular	  influence	  on	  private	  
sector	   investment	  decisions,	   and	   therefore	   is	   a	   key	   component	  of	   the	   investment-­‐
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driven	   business	   cycle.	   Minsky	   argued	   that	   because	   modern	   capital	   investment	   is	  
both	  increasingly	  expensive	  and	  long-­‐lasting	  uncertainty	  plays	  an	  increasing	  role	  in	  
the	  decision	  making	  that	  surrounds	  capitalist	  investment.	  	  	  
Minsky	   adopted	   Keynes’	   view	   that	   economic	   uncertainty	   is	   fundamentally	  
different	   from	   risk,	   although	   neoclassical	   economists	   frequently	   speak	   of	   the	   two	  
interchangeably.65	  He	  pointed	   to	  Keynes’	  1921	  Treatise	  on	  Probability,	   in	  which	  he	  
argued	   that	   not	   only	   were	   uncertainty	   and	   risk	   fundamentally	   different,	   but	   the	  
former	   can	   never	   be	   properly	   reduced	   to	   the	   latter.66	  Consequently,	   an	   uncertain	  
future	  cannot	  be	  expressed	   in	   the	   language	  of	  business	   risk,	  meaning	   it	   cannot	  be	  
modeled,	  hedged	  against,	  or	   reduced	   to	  a	  simple	  mathematical	  variable.	  Economic	  
prognostications	   are	   rife	   with	   uncertainty;	   investment	   patterns,	   taxation,	   labor	  
productivity,	   etc.	   can	   scarcely	   be	   foreseen	   in	   the	   best	   of	   times,	   yet	   their	   future	  
development	  will	   be	   the	  principal	   factor	   in	   the	   justification	  of	   current	   investment	  
through	  future	  profits.	  	  	  
	   The	  role	  of	  fundamental	  uncertainty	  in	  inhibiting	  investment	  is	  compounded	  
by	   what	   Keynes	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   “fetish	   of	   liquidity.”	   In	   the	   General	   Theory	   he	  
noted	   that	   capitalism	   incentivizes	   investors	   to	   hold	   liquid	   assets,	   ranging	   from	  
stocks	   and	   bonds	   to	   treasuries	   and	   cash.	   This	   desire	   is	   directly	   related	   to	   the	  
aforementioned	  role	  of	  uncertainty,	  as	  Keynes	  states,	  “our	  desire	  to	  hold	  Money	  as	  a	  
store	  of	  wealth	  is	  a	  barometer	  of	  the	  degree	  of	  our	  distrust	  of	  our	  own	  calculations	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and	  conventions	  concerning	   the	   future....	  The	  possession	  of	  actual	  money	   lulls	  our	  
disquietude;	  and	  the	  premium	  which	  we	  require	  to	  make	  us	  part	  with	  money	  is	  the	  
measure	  of	  the	  degree	  of	  our	  disquietude.”67	  	  
This	   disquietude	   and	   liquidity	   fetishism	   leads	   capitalists	   to	   place	   a	   higher	  
value	  on	  holding	  liquid	  assets	  over	  long-­‐term	  fixed	  assets,	  and	  therefore	  requires	  a	  
greater	  potential	  return	  on	  investment	  to	  induce	  the	  spending	  on	  capital	  equipment	  
and	   structures	   needed	   to	   reignite	   the	   business	   cycle	   and	   spur	   growth.	   Minsky	  
updated	  and	  revised	  this	  concept	  when	  he	  noted	  that	  every	  institutional	  innovation	  
that	  leads	  to	  both	  new	  ways	  to	  finance	  business	  and	  new	  substitutes	  for	  cash	  assets,	  
decreases	   the	   volume	   of	   liquidity	   available	   to	   redeem	   the	   debts	   incurred	   in	  
investment	  as	  well	  as	  to	  provide	  a	  true	  source	  of	  liquidity	  as	  a	  buffer	  during	  crisis.	  
This	   Keynesian	   vision	   of	   the	   liquidity	   paradox	   implies	   that	   while	   throughout	   the	  
boom	  period	   the	   distinction	   between	  near	  money	   and	  money	  might	   fade	   away,	   it	  
comes	  rushing	  to	  the	  forefront	  again	  when	  distress	  rises	  and	  crisis	  erupts.	  	  
According	   to	   Minsky,	   “A	   financial	   crisis	   leads	   to	   an	   economic	   crisis	   when	  
investment	  declines	  so	  that	  a	  decline	  in	  profits	  as	  well	  as	  output,	  employment,	  and	  
wages	  takes	  place.”68	  The	  decline	  in	  profits	  leads	  to	  a	  further	  decline	  in	  asset	  prices,	  
financial	   firms	   pull	   back	   on	   lending	   for	   investment,	   and	   businesses	   cut	   capital	  
expenditures	   and	   employment	   to	   protect	  margins.	   For	   this	   aspect	   of	   the	   financial	  
instability	   hypothesis	   Minsky	   is	   fusing	   the	   work	   of	   two	   of	   the	   early	   twentieth	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century’s	  most	  distinguished	  economists,	  John	  Maynard	  Keynes	  and	  Michal	  Kalecki.	  
Minsky	   adopts	   Keynes’	   view	   that	   changes	   in	   interest	   rates	   and	   the	   real	   price	   of	  
employment	   cannot	   be	   counted	   on	   to	   realign	   the	   economy	   toward	   equilibrium,	  
spurring	   investment	   and	   therefore	   employment.69	  There	   is	   no	   natural	   tendency	  
toward	  full	  employment	  or	  the	  maximizing	  of	  aggregate	  demand.	  To	  better	  illustrate	  
this,	   and	   to	  provide	  a	   framework	   for	   tracking	   the	  effects	  on	  money	   flows	   through	  
the	   economy,	   Minsky	   utilized	   Kalecki’s	   profit	   equation.	   Kalecki	   showed	   that	   in	   a	  
capitalist	   economy	   the	   primary	   sources	   of	   private	   sector	   aggregate	   profits	   are	  
business	  investment,	  the	  government	  deficit,	  and	  the	  reduction	  of	  labor’s	  savings.70	  	  
The	  financial	  instability	  hypothesis	  illustrates	  the	  adverse	  effects	  of	  financial	  
crises	  on	  the	  real	  economy	  through	  their	  affects	  on	  the	  level	  of	  gross	  investment	  and	  
aggregate	   demand.	   As	   asset	   prices	   fall	   and	   credit	   contracts	   the	   level	   of	   business	  
investment	  and	  employment	  declines,	   leading	   to	  a	   fall	   in	  aggregate	  profits.	  At	   this	  
point	  the	  economy	  risks	  plummeting	  into	  what	  economist	  Irving	  Fisher	  described	  as	  
a	  downward	  spiral	  of	  debt	  deflation.71	  Falling	  prices	  raise	   the	  real	  debt	  burden	  on	  
businesses	   and	   households	  while	   rising	   loan	   defaults	   and	   asset	   impairments	   lead	  
banks	   to	   further	   tighten	   lending	  and	  shrink	   the	  money	  supply.	  The	  cycle	  becomes	  
self-­‐perpetuating	  as	  pessimism	  and	  dire	  expectations	  are	  reinforced.	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Declining	   profit	   leads	   to	   a	   further	   reduction	   in	   investment	   and	   wages,	   as	  
Keynes’	   “animal	   spirits”	   are	  dampened	  and	   liquidity	  and	  capital	  preservation	   take	  
precedence	  over	  investment	  and	  expansion.	  Since	  investment	  is	  the	  primary	  driver	  
of	  business	  profits;	  and	   investment	   is	  only	  made	  if	   there	   is	  a	  reasonable	  chance	  of	  
expanding	   profits	   in	   the	   future,	   this	   creates	   a	   vicious	   cycle	   of	   cost	   cutting	   and	  
declining	  aggregate	  profit.72	  For	  Minsky,	  as	  well	  as	  Keynes	  and	  Kalecki,	   this	   is	  why	  
counter-­‐cyclical	   government	   deficits	   are	   vital.	   They	   supplant	   private	   investment	  
with	  deficit	  fueled	  aggregate	  demand,	  supporting	  business	  profits	  and	  breaking,	  or	  
preventing	  altogether,	  the	  aforementioned	  cycle	  of	  cost	  cutting,	  capital	  preservation,	  
and	  rising	  unemployment.73	  
For	  Minsky	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  government	  deficit	  in	  supporting	  aggregate	  
demand	  during	   recessions	  was	   just	  one	   facet	  his	   larger	  argument	   concerning	   “Big	  
Government	   and	   the	   Big	   Bank.”	   He	   argued	   that	   America’s	   relatively	   stable	   and	  
expansive	  economic	  growth	  in	  the	  post-­‐World	  War	  II	  era	  (particularly	  notable	  for	  its	  
lack	   of	   financial	   crises)	  was	   the	   result	   of	   two	   recent	   shifts	   in	   fiscal	   and	  monetary	  
policy.	  As	  the	  economic	   influence	  of	   the	  government	   increased,	   the	  countercyclical	  
nature	   of	   its	   budget	   expanded	   to	   the	   point	   that	   it	   could	   aid	   in	   smoothing	   the	  
capitalist	   business	   cycle.	   Transfer	   payments,	   infrastructure	   investments,	   and	  
military	   spending	   filled	   the	   gap	   left	   by	   plunging	   private	   investment	   during	  
recessions	   (not	   including	   the	   added	   support	  of	   recession-­‐specific	   stimulus).	  While	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rising	  tax	  receipts	  and	  falling	  aid	  and	  unemployment	  benefits	  restrained	  economic	  
growth	  during	  expansions.	  	  
The	  increasingly	  activist	  role	  of	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  also	  counters	  the	  cycle,	  
primarily	   through	   its	   now	   widely	   accepted	   role	   as	   a	   lender	   of	   last	   resort	   to	   the	  
financial	   system.	   For	   Minsky,	   who	   placed	   such	   great	   emphasis	   on	   the	   banking	  
system,	  the	  Fed’s	  evolving	  policy	  of	  proving	   limitless	   liquidity	  at	  a	  discounted	  rate	  
during	  financial	  panics	  was	  a	  significant	  evolution	  of	  central	  bank	  policy.	  Substantial	  
monetary	   injections	   into	   the	   interbank	   market	   could	   relieve	   financial	   stress,	  
lowering	   lending	   rates	   and	   ensuring	   that	   speculative	   borrowers	   could	   refinance	  
their	   expiring	  debts	   at	   acceptable	   spreads.	  By	   intervening	  early	   and	   forcefully	   the	  
central	  bank	  could	  avert	  a	  large-­‐scale	  credit	  contraction	  and	  lessen	  the	  impact	  that	  
the	  convulsions	  within	  the	  financial	  market	  had	  on	  the	  real	  economy.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   Minsky	  argued	  that	  these	  combined	  actions	  of	  the	  Fed	  and	  Treasury,	  while	  
helping	  to	  ameliorate	  the	  harsher	  features	  of	  the	  capitalist	  business	  cycle,	  have	  also	  
institutionalized	  the	  risky	  and	  speculative	  behaviors	  that	  inevitably	  destabilize	  the	  
system.	  In	  particular,	  he	  noted	  that	  when	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  bails	  out	  financial	  
institutions	  two	  unfortunate	  side	  effects	  arise.	  First,	  disastrously	  high	  leverage	  is	  
maintained	  (as	  impaired	  loans	  are	  papered	  over	  and	  emergency	  funding	  is	  used	  to	  
refinance	  debts),	  and	  second,	  newly	  developed	  forms	  of	  credit	  creation	  and	  
speculation	  are	  validated	  as	  their	  adverse	  conditions	  are	  concealed	  by	  the	  
appearance	  of	  solvency	  and	  profitability	  engineered	  by	  the	  central	  bank.	  The	  
continuation	  of	  these	  policies	  creates	  an	  environment	  of	  financial	  consolidation	  and	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increased	  speculation,	  a	  development	  that	  Minsky	  would	  progressively	  devote	  his	  
attention	  to	  in	  the	  latter	  stage	  of	  his	  career.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Money	  Manager	  Capitalism	  
In	  the	  tradition	  of	  Keynes,	  Minsky	  believed	  that	  political	  economy	  was	  useful	  
to	   the	   extent	   that	   it	   informed	   effective	   policy-­‐making	   and	   aided	   the	   formation	   of	  
political	  and	  economic	  institutions	  that	  could	  help	  produce	  a	  more	  prosperous	  and	  
egalitarian	  society.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  his	  career	  the	  degraded	  state	  of	  economic	  policy	  in	  
America	  led	  him	  to	  conclude	  that	  amongst	  the	  nation’s	  economic	  advisors,	  “Nobody	  
‘up	   there’	   understands	   American	   capitalism“	   and	   to	   deride	   mainstream	  
macroeconomics	  by	  stating	  that	  “In	  the	  neoclassical	  school,	  even	  in	  its	  most	  modern	  
forms,	  it	   is	  not	  clear	  that	  the	  economy	  under	  analysis	  is	  capitalist.”74	  This	  situation	  
was	  all	  the	  more	  dire	  due	  to	  Minsky’s	  belief	  that	  the	  fundamental	  underpinnings	  of	  
the	   successful	   post-­‐WWII	   American	   capitalism	   that	   had	   created	   the	   nation’s	  
burgeoning	  middle-­‐class	  were	  already	  eroding.	  America’s	  quarter-­‐century	  of	  steady	  
growth,	   relative	   stability,	   and	   shared	   prosperity	   was	   being	   replaced	   by	   a	   new	  
evolution	  of	  capitalism	  dominated	  by	  the	  financial	  industry.75	  	  	  
As	  Minsky	  observed	  the	  rising	  centralization	  of	  economic	  power	  and	  political	  
influence	  within	  the	  financial	  sector,	  he	  began	  to	  broaden	  his	  theory	  of	  the	  business	  
cycle	   into	   a	   more	   encompassing	   theory	   of	   modern	   capitalist	   development.	   In	   his	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view	   the	   historical	   evolutionary	   stages	   of	   capitalism	   can	   best	   be	   understood	   by	  
looking	  at	  the	  role	  that	   financial	   institutions	  have	  played	  within	  the	  economy	  over	  
time.	   Specifically,	   he	   adapted	   the	   Schumpeterian	   concept	   of	   “creative	  destruction”	  
and	  posited	  that	  destabilizing	  innovation	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  profit	  is	  more	  evident	  in	  
banking	   and	   finance	   than	   any	   other	   sector	   of	   the	   economy.76	  In	   justifying	   his	  
argument	  Minsky	  noted	  that	  “Innovations	  and	  entrepreneurship	  are	  not	  restricted	  
to	   process	   and	   product	   in	   Schumpeter.	   Innovation	   and	   entrepreneurship	   are	  
characteristics	   of	   capitalist	   finance.	   Because	   credit	   is	   essential	   to	   the	   process	   of	  
development,	  a	  theory	  of	  economic	  development	  needs	  to	  integrate	  money	  into	  its	  
basic	  formulation.”77	  With	  this	  framework	  Minsky	  advanced	  an	  evolutionary	  theory	  
of	   capitalism	   that	   presented	   finance	   and	   credit	   as	   driving	   forces	   of	   long-­‐term	  
development.	  Within	  this	  progression	  he	  identified	  the	  following	  five	  distinct	  stages:	  
commercial	   capitalism,	   industrial	   capitalism,	   financial	   capitalism,	   managerial	  
capitalism,	   and	   money	   manager	   capitalism,	   and	   differentiated	   them	   based	   upon	  
what	   investments	   were	   being	   financed,	   how	   they	   were	   being	   financed,	   and	   the	  
relative	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  capitalists	  and	  financiers.78	  	  
Commercial	   capitalism	   developed	   in	   America	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	  
seventeenth-­‐century	   and	  was	   characterized	   by	   a	   banking	   system	   that	  was	   largely	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local	  and	  based	  around	   the	   financing	  of	   inventory	  and	   trade.	  Merchants	  drove	   the	  
private	  economy,	  while	  bankers	  focused	  on	  specialized	  lending,	  either	  regionally	  or	  
based	   on	   certain	   goods.	   Local	   knowledge	   and	   personal	   relationships	   trumped	  
economic	   scale.	   Banks	  were	   equity	   financed	   by	   their	   owners	   and	   extended	   credit	  
conservatively,	   and	   almost	   always	   against	   collateral.	   Production	  was	   built	   around	  
manual	   labor	   and	   tools,	   and	   investment	   was	   focused	   on	   raw-­‐material	   extraction.	  
Minsky	   noted	   that	   private	   economic	   power	   was	   “fragmented	   and	   dispersed.”79	  
Large-­‐scale	   investment	   in	   productive	   capacity	   was	   rare,	   and	   when	   it	   was	  
undertaken	   the	   financing	   and	  marshaling	   of	   resources	  was	   largely	   the	   domain	   of	  
governments.	  	  
This	   era	   came	   to	   a	   close	  with	   the	   industrialization	   of	   America	   in	   the	   early	  
nineteenth-­‐century.	  The	  rise	  of	  more	  capital-­‐intensive	  means	  of	  production	  meant	  
that	  businessmen	  were	  in	  need	  of	  banks	  that	  could	  extend	  large	  amounts	  of	  credit	  
for	   prolonged	   periods	   of	   time.	   Consequently,	   Minsky	   stated	   that	   industrial	  
capitalism	   “was	   characterized	   by	   the	   emergence	   of	   financial	   organizations	   that	  
could	   mobilize	   vast	   resources	   for	   projects	   such	   as	   railroads,	   utilities,	   mills,	   and	  
mines.”80	  Wealth	   was	   increasingly	   concentrated	   into	   fewer	   hands,	   and	   with	   the	  
increasingly	   important	   role	   of	   financiers	   in	   the	   investment	   process	   financial	  
institutions	   rose	   to	   national	   prominence	   alongside	   their	   industrial	   counterparts.	  
However,	   unregulated	   competition	   and	   cutthroat	   pricing	   were	   leading	   to	   a	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competitive	  process	  that	  was	  destroying	  industrial	  profitability	  and	  jeopardizing	  the	  
economic	  feasibility	  of	  large	  amounts	  of	  invested	  capital.	  
In	   response,	   Minsky	   argued	   that	   by	   the	   end	   of	   nineteenth-­‐century	  
industrialists	  began	  to	   focus	  on	  concentrating	   their	  economic	  and	  political	  powers	  
while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   reducing	   competition	   through	   a	   wave	   of	   mergers	   and	  
acquisitions.	  The	  movement	  was	  so	  pervasive	  that	  by	  1904	  either	  one	  or	  two	  firms	  
controlled	  at	  least	  half	  the	  output	  in	  seventy-­‐eight	  different	  industries.81	  Traditional	  
financial	  institutions	  and	  emerging	  investment	  banks	  welcomed	  the	  development	  as	  
it	   provided	   them	  with	   ample	   profits	  while	   also	   further	   amplifying	   their	   economic	  
importance.	   This	   was	   the	   era	   of	   financial	   capitalism,	   when,	   as	   Minsky	   stated,	  
“banking	  structures	  became	  the	  centers	  of	  economic	  power.	  This	  was	  the	  era	  of	  the	  
houses	   of	   Rothschild	   and	   Morgan.” 82 	  Meanwhile,	   rapid	   increases	   in	   economic	  
productivity	  combined	  with	   little	  regulation	   in	   labor	  markets	   to	   further	  widen	  the	  
income	   and	   wealth	   gaps	   between	   common	   workers	   and	   the	   bankers	   and	  
industrialists	  that	  drove	  the	  economy.	  Post-­‐consolidation	  profits	  rose	  considerably	  
and	   by	   the	   1920s	   bankers	   were	   introducing	   new	   forms	   of	   consumer	   credit	   and	  
engaging	  in	  asset	  price	  speculation	  on	  unprecedented	  levels.	  	  
The	   subsequent	   deflationary	   collapse	   of	   the	   Great	   Depression	   exposed	   the	  
underlying	   fragility	  of	  a	  newly	  modern	  capitalist	  economy.	  Borrowers	  defaulted	  at	  
incredible	   rates,	   banks	   failed	   across	   the	   country,	   and	   large	   amounts	   of	   industrial	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capital	   went	   idle	   as	   a	   growing	   percentage	   of	   labor	   found	   itself	   unemployed.	   In	  
response	   the	   Roosevelt	   administration	   enacted	   large-­‐scale	   financial	   reforms,	  
introduced	   stringent	   banking	   regulations,	   and	   engaged	   in	   counter-­‐cyclical	   deficit	  
spending	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   stabilize	   prices	   and	   reemploy	   large	   segments	   of	   the	  
population.	   Additionally,	   firms	   and	   households	   spent	   well	   over	   a	   decade	  
deleveraging	   their	   respective	   balance	   sheets	   and	   developing	   a	   healthy	   skepticism	  
toward	   financial	   innovation	   and	   debt-­‐financed	   investments.	   As	   a	   consequence,	   by	  
the	  end	  of	  World	  War	  II	   there	  was	  a	   fertile	  domestic	  environment	  for	  a	  prolonged	  
and	  expansive	  cycle	  of	  economic	  growth	  and	  prosperity.83	  
The	  ensuing	  era,	  known	  as	  managerial	  capitalism,	  was	  characterized	  by	  the	  
relative	   stability	   of	   a	   tempered	   financial	   sector	   and	   the	   rise	   of	   the	   federal	  
government’s	  economic	  influence	  through	  both	  fiscal	  and	  monetary	  policy.	  Deposit	  
insurance	  and	  a	  host	  of	  new	  financial	  regulations	  restored	  Americans’	  confidence	  in	  
the	   banking	   system	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   limiting	   the	   speculative	   pursuits	   of	  
financial	   institutions.	   Furthermore,	   after	   years	   of	   massive	   federal	   deficits	   the	  
balance	   sheets	   of	   private	   firms	   and	   households	   were	   awash	   in	   highly	   liquid	   and	  
secure	   government	   bonds.	   When	   combined	   with	   a	   general	   aversion	   to	   debt	   this	  
meant	  that	  American	  businesses	  and	  investors	  were	  far	  more	  financially	  stable	  than	  
in	  past	  economic	  cycles.	  	  
Minsky	  argues	  that	  because	  firms	  were	  internally	  financed	  and	  highly	  liquid	  
they	   were	   not	   as	   beholden	   to	   the	   whims	   of	   the	   financial	   sector	   as	   they	   had	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previously	   been.	  He	   states,	   “the	   finance	   capitalism	  model	   of	   banker	   dominance	   of	  
capitalist	   development	   was	   not	   relevant.”84	  Corporate	  managements	   were	   able	   to	  
pursue	  long-­‐term	  goals,	  negotiate	  in	  good	  faith	  with	  labor,	  and	  generally	  engage	  in	  
more	   socially	   responsible	  business	  practices.	  However,	   this	  evolution	  of	  American	  
capitalism	  was	  fragile	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  its	  sustained	  existence	  was	  predicated	  on	  the	  
continuation	  of	  unique	  trends	  in	  both	  the	  domestic	  and	  international	  environments.	  
In	  particular,	  the	  restricted	  competition	  of	  domestic	  business	  would	  inevitably	  come	  
into	   conflict	   with	   the	   reemergence	   of	   international	   competition.85	  Meanwhile,	   the	  
repression	   of	   the	   America’s	   banks	   was	   gradually	   subsiding	   as	   a	   combination	   of	  
moral	  hazard	  arising	  from	  Federal	  Reserve	  interventions	  combined	  with	  the	  gradual	  
reduction	  of	  both	  borrower’s	  and	  lender’s	  margins	  of	  safety	  allowed	  financial	  firms	  
to	  begin	  regaining	  their	  previous	  influence.	  	  
Minsky	  states,	  “In	  the	  postwar	  era,	  managed-­‐money	  capitalism,	  a	  new	  form,	  
was	   born	   out	   of	   the	   success	   of	   managerial	   capitalism.” 86 	  During	   the	   era	   of	  
managerial	  capitalism	  America	  experienced	  no	  serious	  economic	  downturns,	  while	  
economic	  growth	  was	  robust	  and	  income	  and	  wealth	  were	  widely	  distributed	  across	  
the	  economic	  spectrum.	  The	  period	  was	  particularly	  notable	  for	  the	  dramatic	  rise	  of	  
managed-­‐money;	   pension	   funds,	   mutual	   funds,	   and	   money-­‐market	   funds	   became	  
the	  dominant	  means	  of	  allocating	  financial	  capital	  across	  the	  economy.	  The	  growth	  
of	  private	  pensions	  accompanied	  the	  rise	  of	  unions,	  while	  mutual	  funds	  and	  money-­‐
market	   funds	   were	   increasingly	   seen	   as	   the	   safest	   ways	   to	   ensure	   the	   future	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purchasing	  power	  of	  private	  savings	  in	  an	  increasingly	  inflationary	  environment.	  As	  
a	   result,	   Minsky	   noted	   “a	   large	   portion	   of	   the	   outstanding	   shares	   of	   major	  
corporations	   are	   now	   owned	   by	   these	   large	   institutional	   holders,	   who	   actively	  
manage	  their	  funds	  with	  the	  objective	  of	  maximizing	  the	  total	  portfolio	  return	  over	  
each	  short	  period.”87	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The	  rise	  of	  managed-­‐money	  funds	  has	  provoked	  two	  large-­‐scale	  shifts	  in	  the	  
role	   America’s	   financial	   institutions	   play	   within	   the	   economy.	   First,	   as	   Minsky	  
argues,	   “Managed	  money	   capitalism	  has	   diminished	   the	   financial	   independence	   of	  
corporate	  management.”88	  America’s	  corporations	  have	  become	  increasingly	  short-­‐
term	  oriented	  as	  their	  focus	  has	  gradually	  shifted	  toward	  maximizing	  current	  profits	  
and	   stock	   market	   valuations.	   Corporate	   downsizing	   and	   restructurings	   have	   also	  
become	  more	  frequent,	  as	  more	  easily	  adaptable	  cost	  structures	  are	  needed	  in	  order	  
to	   better	   maintain	   profits	   and	   share	   prices	   across	   the	   business	   cycle.89	  These	  
reorientations	   of	   American	   capitalism	   are	   fervently	   pursued	   under	   the	   banner	   of	  
“maximizing	  shareholder	  value.”90	  As	  a	  consequence	  job	  security	  has	  fallen	  steadily	  
and	   wage	   growth	   in	   many	   labor-­‐intensive	   sectors	   of	   the	   economy	   has	   been	  
nonexistent;	  meanwhile	  corporate	  profits	  and	  stock	  prices	  soared.91	  	  	  
American	   business	   has	   also	   become	   increasingly	   “financialized.”	   Non-­‐
financial	   firms	   have	   adopted	   the	   widespread	   belief	   that	   financial	   engineering	   is	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desirable	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  increasing	  stock	  market	  valuations.	  An	  incredible	  rise	  in	  
mergers,	   acquisitions,	   leveraged	   buyouts,	   corporate	   spinoffs,	   and	   stock	   buybacks	  
has	   followed,	  all	   in	   the	  name	  of	  maximizing	  shareholder	  value.92	  The	  expansion	  of	  
managed-­‐money	   funds	  has	  also	  encouraged	  a	   rapid	  rise	   in	   financial	   innovation.	   In	  
particular	   Minsky	   argued,	   “Money	   managers	   are	   a	   large	   part	   of	   the	   market	   for	  
securitized	   instruments…that	  mete	  out	   the	  cash	   flow	  from	  a	  corpus	  of	  assets…in	  a	  
way	   that	   is	   tailor-­‐made	   to	   suit	   the	   objectives	   of	   particular	   funds.”93	  He	   also	   noted	  
that	   as	   managed-­‐money	   funds	   became	   increasingly	   global	   their	   influence	   in	  
international	   capital	   markets	   would	   intensify.	   Specifically,	   he	   argued	   that	   the	  
international	  trading	  of	  managed-­‐money	  funds	  had	  already	  “rendered	  obsolete	  the	  
view	  that	  trade	  patterns	  determine	  the	  short-­‐run	  movement	  of	  exchange	  rates.”94	  	  	  	  	  
For	   Minsky,	   money	   manager	   capitalism	   increased	   both	   the	   speed	   and	  
frequency	  of	   financial	   instability.	  This	   is	  mainly	  attributed	   to	   the	   increased	  role	  of	  
debt	  and	  finance	  in	  the	  modern	  economy.	  Spurious	  “financial	  innovation”	  has	  driven	  
the	   proliferation	   of	   credit-­‐based	   instruments	   throughout	   the	   private	   sector,	  
resulting	   in	   financial	   and	   household	   leverage	   ratios	   far	   beyond	   those	   seen	   in	  
previous	  business	   cycles.95	  Consumption	  booms	   related	   to	   increased	   indebtedness	  
are	  self-­‐defeating,	  and	  corresponding	  recoveries	  are	  historically	  weak	  and	  fragile,	  as	  
accumulated	   debt	   stocks	   weigh	   on	   future	   consumption	   and	   investment.	   From	   a	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Minskian	  perspective,	  the	  overall	  	  “financialization”	  of	  the	  economy	  can	  only	  lead	  to	  
increasing	  debt,	  extreme	  price	  volatility,	  and	  more	  frequent	  and	  pronounced	  bouts	  
of	  financial	  instability	  and	  subsequent	  recession.96	  	  
	  
Minskian	  Theory	  in	  Perspective	  
Minsky’s	  theories	  regarding	  money,	  banking,	  and	  their	  relation	  to	  the	  
capitalist	  business	  cycle	  rest	  far	  outside	  of	  mainstream	  economics.	  Yet	  his	  
theoretical	  foundations	  are	  clearly	  traceable	  to	  some	  of	  economics	  most	  prominent	  
and	  influential	  theorists.97	  	  Minsky	  argued	  that	  he	  was	  creating	  an	  “investment	  
theory	  of	  the	  cycle	  and	  a	  financial	  theory	  of	  investment.”	  He	  refused	  to	  accept	  the	  
neutrality	  of	  money	  and	  instead	  positioned	  financial	  institutions	  at	  the	  core	  of	  a	  
modern	  capitalist	  economy.	  In	  doing	  so	  he	  plainly	  argued	  for	  what	  Keynes	  called	  “a	  
monetary	  theory	  of	  production,”	  a	  concept	  whose	  origins	  can	  easily	  be	  seen	  in	  some	  
of	  the	  most	  significant	  economic	  writings	  of	  the	  late-­‐nineteenth	  century.	  	  
A	  clear	  forerunner	  to	  Minsky’s	  credit-­‐based	  theory	  of	  capitalist	  instability	  can	  
be	  found	  in	  Marx’s	  Capital,	  where	  he	  provides	  the	  foundations	  for	  a	  monetary	  circuit	  
theory	  of	  capitalist	  production.	  Within	  Marx’s	  famous	  equations	  for	  capitalist	  
accumulation	  he	  explicitly	  rejects	  the	  classical	  arguments	  for	  barter-­‐exchange	  and	  
the	  neutrality	  of	  money	  as	  the	  foundations	  of	  market	  transactions.	  He	  argued	  that	  
the	  fundamental	  model	  for	  capitalist	  transactions	  is	  not	  C-­‐M-­‐C,	  where	  money	  only	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serves	  to	  facilitate	  the	  exchange	  of	  commodities.	  Instead,	  in	  a	  capitalist	  economy	  
characterized	  by	  “the	  circulation	  of	  money	  as	  capital”	  the	  former	  clearly	  affects	  
behavior	  and	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  economic	  development.98	  Knowing	  this	  Marx	  argued	  
that	  “the	  general	  formula	  for	  capital,	  in	  the	  form	  in	  which	  it	  appears	  directly	  in	  the	  
sphere	  of	  circulation”	  is	  M-­‐C-­‐M’,	  where	  money	  capital	  (M)	  is	  transferred	  through	  the	  
capitalist	  mode	  of	  production	  (C)	  into	  money	  capital	  plus	  surplus	  value	  (M’).99	  It	  is	  
through	  this	  process	  that	  capitalists	  realize	  the	  monetary	  profits	  that	  are	  the	  basis	  
for	  capital	  accumulation:	  simultaneously	  providing	  the	  justification	  of	  past	  
investments	  and	  the	  means	  for	  current	  investment	  as	  well.	  	  	  
By	  re-­‐characterizing	  capitalist	  production	  as	  beginning	  with	  the	  extension	  of	  
money	  capital	  Marx	  allows	  for	  a	  modern	  credit-­‐based	  economy	  where	  debt-­‐financed	  
investment	  is	  only	  later	  validated	  through	  monetary	  profits	  that	  exceed	  the	  initial	  
debts.	  This	  framework	  of	  capitalist	  production	  resembles	  Minsky’s	  financial	  theory	  
of	  the	  investment	  cycle.	  	  Even	  greater	  similarities	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Capital	  III	  where	  
Marx	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  capitalist	  financial	  crises.	  He	  notes	  that	  during	  
economic	  expansions	  “a	  period	  of	  brisk	  business	  is	  simultaneously,	  a	  period	  of	  most	  
elastic	  and	  easy	  credit.”	  However,	  he	  notes	  that	  rising	  indebtedness	  and	  
overinvestment	  will	  eventually	  bring	  about	  a	  crisis	  in	  which	  “prices	  fall,	  similarly	  
wages;	  the	  number	  of	  employed	  laborers	  is	  reduced,	  the	  mass	  of	  transactions	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decreases.”100	  A	  self-­‐perpetuating	  cycle	  of	  debt	  deflation	  takes	  hold	  as	  financiers	  
restrict	  credit.	  Marx	  states,	  “It	  is	  by	  no	  means	  the	  strong	  demand	  for	  loans	  which	  
distinguishes	  the	  period	  of	  depression	  from	  that	  of	  prosperity,	  but	  the	  ease	  with	  
which	  this	  demand	  is	  satisfied	  in	  prosperity,	  and	  the	  difficulties	  it	  meets	  in	  times	  of	  
depression.”101	  With	  this	  analysis	  Marx	  provided	  a	  debt-­‐driven	  business	  cycle	  that	  
hinged	  on	  the	  pro-­‐cyclical	  aspects	  of	  the	  expansion	  and	  contraction	  of	  money	  capital	  
within	  the	  economy.	  
	  Picking	  up	  on	  Marx’s	  work,	  Keynes	  began	  to	  develop	  his	  own	  theory	  of	  
monetary	  capitalism	  in	  the	  early	  1930s.	  By	  1932	  he	  had	  renamed	  his	  Cambridge	  
lecture	  series	  from	  “The	  Pure	  Theory	  of	  Money”	  to	  “The	  Monetary	  Theory	  of	  
Production,”	  and	  in	  1933	  he	  published	  an	  essay	  by	  the	  same	  name.102	  Keynes	  
focused	  on	  Marx’s	  “realization	  problem”	  formulated	  in	  M-­‐C-­‐M’	  and	  noted	  that	  
capitalists	  only	  invest	  money	  capital	  into	  production	  when	  they	  are	  certain	  they	  can	  
realize	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  money	  capital	  in	  the	  future.	  Therefore,	  as	  Keynes	  began	  
writing	  the	  General	  Theory	  to	  propose	  his	  investment-­‐driven	  business	  cycle	  he	  was	  
well	  aware	  of	  the	  important	  role	  money	  played	  in	  the	  process.	  	  
Keynes	  made	  the	  importance	  of	  money	  to	  capitalist	  production	  clear	  in	  an	  
early	  draft	  of	  his	  General	  Theory.	  He	  further	  addressed	  Marx’s	  M-­‐C-­‐M’	  formula,	  
designating	  it	  as	  the	  fundamental	  force	  behind	  an	  “entrepreneurial	  economy.”	  
Concerning	  Marx,	  Keynes	  noted,	  “He	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  production	  in	  the	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actual	  world	  is	  not,	  as	  economists	  seem	  often	  to	  suppose,	  a	  case	  of	  C-­‐M-­‐C…That	  may	  
be	  the	  standpoint	  of	  the	  private	  consumer.	  But	  it	  is	  not	  the	  attitude	  of	  business,	  
which	  is	  a	  case	  of	  M-­‐C-­‐M’,	  i.e.	  of	  parting	  with	  money	  for	  commodity	  (or	  effort)	  in	  
order	  to	  obtain	  more	  money.”103	  He	  went	  on	  to	  illuminate	  the	  capitalist’s	  desire	  to	  
accumulate	  money	  capital	  as	  being	  the	  driving	  force	  behind	  his	  desire	  to	  invest	  in	  
production	  and	  employ	  labor.	  This	  is	  a	  fundamental	  aspect	  of	  a	  capitalist	  economy,	  
and	  played	  a	  notable	  role	  in	  Minsky’s	  formulation	  of	  the	  financial	  instability	  
hypothesis.	  In	  many	  ways	  Minsky’s	  work	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  supplement	  
the	  businessman’s	  drive	  for	  profit	  featured	  in	  Marx	  and	  Keynes	  with	  the	  banker’s	  
desire	  for	  the	  same.	  	  
The	  theoretical	  foundation	  for	  this	  kind	  of	  analysis	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Rudolf	  
Hilferding’s	  Finance	  Capital,	  published	  in	  1910.104	  Like	  Minsky,	  he	  sought	  to	  
construct	  a	  developmental	  model	  of	  capitalism	  that	  could	  account	  for	  the	  growing	  
influence	  of	  financial	  capital	  in	  the	  economy.	  At	  the	  time	  Hilferding’s	  work	  was	  seen	  
as	  a	  logical	  extension	  of	  Marx’s	  arguments	  in	  Capital.	  He	  posited	  that	  the	  internal	  
contradictions	  that	  Marx	  highlighted	  within	  capitalism	  were	  becoming	  more	  acute,	  
as	  the	  growing	  concentration	  of	  capital	  (predicted	  by	  Marx)	  and	  the	  increasing	  
power	  of	  finance	  were	  widening	  social	  inequality	  and	  the	  disparity	  of	  economic	  
opportunity.105	  For	  Hilferding	  the	  dire	  situation	  was	  primarily	  due	  to	  the	  rise	  of	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finance	  capital,	  which	  he	  felt	  was	  the	  latest	  developmental	  stage	  of	  capitalism	  on	  the	  
road	  to	  eventual	  socialism.	  	  
In	  Finance	  Capital	  Hilferding	  argued	  that	  the	  evolution	  of	  highly	  capital-­‐
intensive	  industry	  fueled	  the	  growth	  of	  finance	  capital	  due	  to	  the	  need	  for	  extensive	  
financing	  to	  construct	  increasingly	  large	  economies	  of	  scale	  for	  production.	  Fierce	  
competition	  drove	  industrial	  and	  commercial	  capital	  to	  heavy	  concentration	  in	  
order	  to	  monopolize	  markets	  and	  preserve	  profitability.	  Throughout	  this	  process	  
industry	  became	  increasingly	  reliant	  on	  banks	  for	  financing.	  Hilferding	  argued	  that	  
as	  financiers	  acquired	  larger	  proportions	  of	  industry	  through	  financing,	  their	  
relative	  power	  within	  the	  economy	  soon	  eclipsed	  their	  capitalist	  brethren.	  Building	  
on	  Marx’s	  Capital	  he	  further	  argued	  that	  because	  finance	  capital	  is	  characterized	  by	  
a	  fairly	  steady	  rate	  of	  interest,	  while	  the	  capital	  intensity	  of	  industry	  accelerates	  the	  
falling	  rate	  of	  profit,	  the	  financial	  share	  of	  profits	  in	  developed	  capitalist	  economies	  
will	  rise.106	  This	  further	  solidifies	  the	  dominance	  of	  financial	  institutions	  within	  the	  
economy.	  	  
Hilferding	  went	  on	  to	  argue	  that	  because	  financial	  institutions	  hold	  
increasingly	  large	  stakes	  in	  industrial	  and	  commercial	  industry	  they	  have	  an	  
interest	  to	  limit	  competition	  within	  those	  industries	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  maximize	  
profits.107	  Banks	  accomplished	  this	  by	  pushing	  for	  increased	  centralization	  and	  the	  
further	  monopolizing	  of	  markets.	  Hilferding	  referred	  to	  this	  process	  as	  cartelization	  
and	  noted,	  “As	  a	  result…the	  relations	  between	  the	  banks	  and	  industry	  become	  still	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closer,	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  the	  banks	  acquire	  an	  increasing	  control	  over	  the	  capital	  
invested	  in	  industry.”108	  He	  argued	  that	  there	  is	  a	  constant	  tendency	  toward	  
cartelization	  in	  finance	  capital	  and	  that	  eventually	  entire	  industries	  would	  be	  
subsumed	  in	  the	  process.109	  	  
Eventually	  Hilferding	  extended	  his	  argument	  overseas	  and	  declared	  that	  
European	  imperialism	  was	  largely	  driven	  by	  the	  need	  to	  find	  external	  outlets	  for	  the	  
profitable	  operation	  of	  finance	  capital’s	  burgeoning	  industrial	  centers.	  He	  argued	  
that	  this	  is	  the	  final	  stage	  of	  finance	  capital,	  and	  that	  it	  was	  characterized	  by	  three	  
distinct	  objectives:	  “(1)	  to	  establish	  the	  largest	  possible	  economic	  territory	  (2)	  to	  
close	  the	  territory	  to	  foreign	  competition	  by	  a	  wall	  of	  protective	  tariffs,	  and	  
consequently	  (3)	  to	  reserve	  it	  as	  an	  area	  of	  exploitation	  for	  the	  national	  
monopolistic	  combinations.”110	  The	  eventual	  undoing	  of	  finance	  capital,	  in	  
Hilferding’s	  analysis,	  was	  to	  come	  via	  the	  revolt	  of	  the	  masses	  due	  to	  the	  high	  cost	  in	  
blood	  and	  treasure	  that	  was	  required	  of	  them	  to	  financially	  and	  militarily	  support	  
such	  extensive	  overseas	  empires.	  Eventually,	  the	  highly	  concentrated	  nature	  of	  the	  
means	  of	  production	  within	  financial	  institutions	  would	  allow	  society	  “through	  its	  
conscious	  executive-­‐organ—the	  state	  conquered	  by	  the	  working	  class—to	  seize	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financial	  capital	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  immediate	  control	  of	  these	  branches	  of	  
production.”111	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
There	  are	  clear	  connections	  between	  Hilferding’s	  concept	  of	  finance	  capital	  
and	  Minsky’s	  theory	  of	  money-­‐manager	  capitalism.	  In	  particular,	  both	  focus	  
primarily	  on	  the	  rise	  of	  capital-­‐intensive	  means	  of	  production	  as	  chief	  aids	  in	  the	  
formation	  of	  large-­‐scale	  banking	  institutions.	  Both	  also	  note	  how	  industry	  can	  
become	  “financialized,”	  in	  Minsky’s	  terminology,	  as	  it	  is	  increasingly	  owned	  by	  
financial	  institutions,	  and	  therefore	  operated	  with	  their	  primary	  interests	  in	  mind.	  
Importantly,	  both	  also	  note	  the	  tendency	  of	  financial	  institutions	  to	  drive	  
concentration	  and	  to	  limit	  the	  competitive	  powers	  of	  markets	  in	  order	  to	  maximize	  
profits.	  Hilferding	  also	  notes	  the	  need	  for	  a	  strong	  state	  for	  the	  taxation	  and	  military	  
might	  needed	  to	  support	  finance	  capitalism.	  This	  is	  very	  reminiscent	  of	  Minsky’s	  
argument	  that	  money-­‐manager	  capitalism	  requires	  an	  increasingly	  interventionist	  
Treasury	  and	  Federal	  Reserve	  to	  contain	  financial	  instability	  and	  maintain	  
corporate	  profits	  in	  order	  to	  validate	  past	  investments	  and	  current	  debt	  burdens.	  
Ernest	  Mandel	  was	  another	  economic	  theorist	  who	  developed	  an	  
evolutionary	  model	  of	  capitalism.112	  Mandel	  based	  his	  theory	  around	  Marx’s	  
volumes	  of	  Capital,	  noting	  that	  even	  modern	  capitalism	  is	  still,	  at	  its	  heart,	  
capitalism;	  and	  consequently	  that	  Marx’s	  laws	  of	  capitalist	  motion	  must	  form	  the	  
foundation	  of	  a	  coherent	  theory.	  In	  particular,	  Mandel	  placed	  great	  emphasis	  on	  the	  
tendency	  of	  the	  rate	  of	  profit	  to	  fall	  over	  time	  in	  capitalist	  production,	  as	  well	  as	  the	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inherent	  drive	  for	  capitalist	  accumulation	  that	  underlies	  the	  economic	  system.	  
However,	  Mandel	  added	  a	  unique	  perspective	  to	  these	  fundamental	  tenets	  of	  classic	  
Marxism	  when	  he	  integrated	  them	  alongside	  the	  long	  and	  short	  waves	  of	  capitalist	  
development	  that	  were	  popularized	  by	  Russian	  economist	  Nikolai	  Kondratiev.113	  	  	  	  	  
In	  Mandel’s	  theory	  the	  initial	  stages	  of	  capitalist	  development	  play	  out	  
similarly	  to	  those	  in	  Capital.	  As	  the	  business	  cycle	  expands	  the	  money	  value	  of	  the	  
capital	  stock	  grows	  at	  a	  rate	  faster	  than	  the	  relative	  rate	  of	  surplus	  value.	  As	  a	  
consequence	  capitalists	  must	  invest	  proportionately	  increasing	  amounts	  of	  money	  
capital	  to	  produce	  additional	  profit.	  Mandel	  argues	  that	  this	  falling	  rate	  of	  profit	  
deters	  capitalists	  from	  reorganizing	  production	  and	  investing	  in	  new	  
technologies.114	  Subsequently,	  investment	  falls,	  unemployment	  rises,	  and	  greater	  
quantities	  of	  capital	  go	  idle	  for	  want	  of	  profitable	  opportunities.	  Where	  Mandel	  
diverges	  from	  Marx	  and	  Capital	  is	  in	  his	  argument	  that	  as	  these	  short	  cycles	  
continue	  an	  increasing	  level	  of	  “excess	  capital”	  builds	  up	  so	  that,	  when	  combined	  
with	  large	  amounts	  of	  unemployed	  labor,	  its	  redeployment	  can	  spark	  a	  generational	  
surge	  of	  investment.	  
This	  surge	  of	  technological	  development	  and	  capital	  investment	  is	  predicated	  
on	  the	  restoration	  of	  the	  rate	  of	  profit	  during	  the	  preceding	  years	  of	  slow	  growth	  
and	  high	  unemployment.	  Provided	  these	  conditions	  have	  weakened	  labor	  and	  
devalued	  real	  wages	  (generally	  accomplished	  by	  an	  expansion	  of	  the	  reserve	  army	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Nikolai Kondratiev, The Major Economic Cycles, translated and published as The Long Wave 
Cycle (New York: Richardson & Snyder, 1984), and later in Nikolai Kondratiev, “The Long 
Waves in Economic Life,” Review of Economic Statistics 17.6 (1935): 105-115. 
114 Mandel, Late Capitalism, 111. 
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of	  the	  unemployed)	  or	  prompted	  a	  sudden	  fall	  in	  the	  organic	  composition	  of	  capital	  
(usually	  through	  a	  dramatic	  fall	  is	  price	  of	  capital	  assets)	  the	  environment	  will	  be	  
fertile	  for	  capitalist	  expansion.	  Investment	  in	  new	  technology	  will	  provide	  a	  strong,	  
secular	  countercurrent	  against	  the	  falling	  rate	  of	  profit,	  as	  recessions	  are	  shallow	  
and	  infrequent	  while	  expansions	  are	  broad-­‐based	  and	  plentiful.	  Still,	  eventually	  the	  
internal	  contradictions	  of	  capitalism	  rise	  to	  the	  surface	  once	  more.	  As	  the	  economy	  
moves	  toward	  full	  employment	  labor	  gains	  new	  power	  and	  confidence,	  meanwhile	  
increasing	  levels	  of	  competition	  and	  rising	  investment	  lead	  to	  a	  flattening	  of	  the	  rate	  
of	  profit.	  The	  cycle	  is	  now	  primed	  to	  repeat	  itself.	  
Utilizing	  this	  wave-­‐based	  model	  of	  development	  Mandel	  argued,	  “The	  history	  
of	  capitalism	  on	  the	  international	  plane	  thus	  appears	  as	  not	  only	  a	  succession	  of	  
cyclical	  movements	  every	  7	  to	  10	  years,	  but	  also	  as	  a	  succession	  of	  longer	  periods,	  of	  
approximately	  50	  years,	  of	  which	  we	  have	  experienced	  four	  up	  to	  now.”115	  In	  tracing	  
these	  past	  epochs	  Mandel	  resembles	  Minsky,	  the	  former	  focusing	  on	  technological	  
shifts	  and	  the	  latter	  on	  financial	  shifts.	  Both	  also	  focus	  on	  the	  growing	  influence	  of	  
the	  state	  in	  stabilizing	  an	  increasingly	  volatile	  economic	  system.116	  Mandel,	  on	  
growing	  state	  capitalism,	  argued,	  “In	  the	  framework	  of	  this	  private	  capitalist	  
economic	  order,	  state	  direction	  and	  guidance	  of	  the	  economy	  are	  only	  makeshifts	  to	  
patch	  up	  fissures	  and	  postpone	  explosions.	  But	  behind	  the	  façade	  the	  decay	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Mandel, Late Capitalism, 120. 
116 Recently there have been interesting attempts at melding K-Waves together with long-term 
credit cycles, as opposed to Mandel’s primary focus on capital innovation, for example see Steve 
Keen, “The Economic Case Against Bernanke,” Steve Keen’s Debtwatch, No. 42 (February 2010).   
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spreading.”117	  Like	  Minsky,	  Mandel	  also	  noted	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  state	  to	  support	  
capitalist	  profits	  through	  counter-­‐cyclical	  spending	  and	  transfer	  payments.118	  
However,	  he	  also	  noted	  a	  more	  sinister	  motive	  behind	  the	  government’s	  
stabilization	  of	  private	  profits	  and	  support	  of	  labor	  income	  during	  economic	  
downturns.	  Mandel	  argued,	  “the	  entire	  logic	  of	  a	  managed	  economy	  is	  precisely	  to	  
avoid	  strikes	  and	  attempted	  improvements	  during	  the	  only	  phase	  of	  the	  cycle	  in	  
which	  the	  relationship	  of	  class	  forces	  favors	  the	  working	  class.”119	   	  
Hyman	  Minsky’s	  theoretical	  framework	  was	  constructed	  upon	  the	  
foundation	  of	  heterodox	  economics	  that	  was	  highly	  prominent	  in	  the	  late-­‐19th	  and	  
early-­‐20th	  centuries.	  In	  many	  ways	  his	  greatest	  contribution	  to	  the	  history	  of	  
economic	  thought	  was	  his	  ability	  to	  fully	  comprehend	  and	  absorb	  these	  different	  
theories,	  assimilating	  them	  into	  a	  brilliant	  theory	  of	  capitalist	  development	  and	  
business	  cycles.	  Minsky’s	  financial	  instability	  hypothesis	  was	  based	  on	  his	  realization	  
that	  financial	  institutions	  play	  an	  outsized	  role	  in	  modern	  industrial	  and	  post-­‐
industrial	  economies.	  Meanwhile,	  his	  ideas	  regarding	  money-­‐manager	  capitalism	  
led	  him	  to	  conclude	  that	  modern	  capitalism	  was	  at	  a	  unique	  developmental	  stage:	  at	  
not	  other	  time	  has	  international	  financial	  capital	  been	  able	  to	  flow	  so	  freely	  across	  
borders,	  and	  at	  no	  time	  has	  the	  direction	  of	  such	  a	  large	  portion	  of	  those	  flows	  been	  
guided	  by	  so	  few	  individuals.	  When	  faced	  with	  a	  combination	  of	  these	  two	  factors	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Mandel, Late Capitalism, 502. 
118 Mandel tends to focus on the role of state spending on arms and defense in supporting private 
employment and “the state guaranty of profit.” This form of “military Keynesianism” has been a 
prominent Marxist explanation for the post-WWII economic expansion in the developed world. 
For example, see T.N. Vance and Walter Oakes, The Permanent War Economy (Alameda, 
California: Center for Socialist History, 2008). 
119 Ernest Mandel, An Introduction to Marxist Economic Theory (New York: Pathfinder Press, 
1969), 101. 
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Minsky	  found	  it	  entirely	  reasonable	  to	  predict	  steadily	  increasing	  bouts	  of	  financial	  
crisis	  and	  turmoil.120	  His	  predictions	  proved	  prescient,	  and	  nowhere	  have	  they	  been	  
seen	  to	  a	  greater	  degree	  than	  within	  the	  developing	  economies	  that	  have	  become	  
the	  targets	  of	  the	  financial	  flows	  that	  Minsky	  warned	  about	  decades	  ago.	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III.	  THE	  ASIAN	  FINANCIAL	  CRISIS	  OF	  1997-­‐98	  
	   The	  Asian	  financial	  crisis	  was	  an	  intense	  and	  volatile	  period	  beginning	  in	  
mid-­‐1997	  that	  wreaked	  havoc	  throughout	  developed	  and	  emerging	  world	  markets	  
and	  triggered	  widespread	  fears	  of	  financial	  contagion	  and	  global	  recession.	  The	  
crisis,	  which	  lingered	  throughout	  Southeast	  Asia	  until	  early	  1999,	  was	  characterized	  
by	  the	  destabilizing	  and	  violent	  spasms	  of	  the	  financial	  markets.	  Seemingly	  
uncorrelated	  asset	  prices	  began	  moving	  in	  unison	  as	  the	  global	  marketplace	  
attempted	  to	  digest	  the	  hourly	  reports	  of	  default,	  bankruptcy,	  and	  capital	  flight	  that	  
turned	  what	  many	  thought	  was	  only	  a	  typical	  developing	  world	  currency	  crisis	  into	  
a	  full-­‐scale	  financial	  panic.	  
	   At	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  Asian	  financial	  crisis	  a	  majority	  of	  investors	  and	  firms	  held	  
the	  developing	  East	  Asian	  economies	  in	  the	  highest	  regard.	  Decades	  of	  stellar	  
growth	  in	  the	  region	  had	  conditioned	  them	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  region’s	  path	  to	  future	  
growth	  was	  clear	  and	  sustainable.	  Much	  like	  the	  vaunted	  “Asian	  Tigers”	  who	  
dominated	  the	  post-­‐WWII	  expansion	  within	  the	  region	  the	  newly	  designated	  “Asian	  
Cubs”	  were	  seen	  as	  inevitable	  successors	  and	  the	  backbone	  of	  a	  future	  Asian	  
Century.121	  This	  view	  was	  crystalized	  in	  1993	  with	  the	  release	  of	  a	  highly	  influential	  
paper	  from	  the	  World	  Bank	  titled,	  “The	  East	  Asian	  Miracle,”	  that	  praised	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Eun Mee Kim, ed., The Four Asian Tigers: Economic Development and the Global Political 
Economy (Bradford, United Kingdom: Emerald Group Publishing, 1999). 
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development	  models	  of	  East	  Asia	  and	  posited	  that	  economies	  from	  Africa	  to	  Central	  
and	  South	  America	  should	  readjust	  their	  own	  policies	  to	  mimic	  the	  East	  Asian	  
countries.	  122	  	  
This	  miraculous	  growth,	  however,	  was	  powered	  by	  decidedly	  routine	  
endeavors.	  Much	  like	  their	  larger	  Asian	  brethren,	  the	  small	  developing	  nations	  of	  
the	  region	  were	  rapidly	  industrializing	  and	  urbanizing	  on	  an	  incredible	  scale.	  To	  aid	  
in	  their	  economic	  development	  the	  East	  Asian	  nations	  were	  enacting	  an	  export-­‐
driven	  growth	  strategy	  that	  centered	  on	  developing	  low-­‐tech	  manufactured	  goods	  
for	  sale	  in	  the	  developed	  West.123	  This	  strategy	  would	  provide	  multiple	  benefits,	  
including	  1)	  the	  importing	  of	  foreign	  demand	  to	  maintain	  employment	  and	  wages,	  
2)	  the	  importing	  of	  foreign	  capital	  to	  revolutionize	  technological	  and	  manufacturing	  
industries,	  3)	  the	  development	  of	  “manufacturing	  clusters”	  that	  spurred	  domestic	  
innovation,	  and	  4)	  the	  importing	  of	  developed	  world	  currencies	  and	  resulting	  lack	  of	  
reliance	  on	  foreign	  debt	  for	  trade	  financing.124	  	  
Specifically,	  the	  importing	  of	  foreign	  income	  provided	  a	  net	  stimulus	  to	  the	  
domestic	  private	  economy	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  that	  government	  deficits	  do.125	  As	  
a	  consequence	  while	  the	  East	  Asian	  nations	  were	  developing	  through	  export-­‐driven	  
growth	  models	  they	  were	  able	  to	  subsidize	  domestic	  demand	  without	  running	  large	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 “The East Asian Miracle,” The World Bank (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).  
123 For a prominent critique of this development model see, Paul Krugman, “The Myth of Asia’s 
Miracle,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, no. 6 (1994): 62-75. 
124 Joseph Stiglitz, “Some Lessons From the East Asian Miracle,” The World Bank Observer vol. 
11, no. 2 (1996): 151-177. 
125 For an example of the “sectoral balances” approach to macroeconomics see Wynne Godley, 
“Money, Finance and National Income Determination: An Integrated Approach,” Jerome Levy 
Economics Institute of Bard College, Paper 167 (1996).  
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government	  deficits,	  a	  vital	  aspect	  of	  successful	  development	  for	  any	  emerging	  
economy.	  The	  end	  result	  was	  a	  secular	  growth	  boom,	  as	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  1,	  that	  
brought	  rising	  prosperity	  and	  better	  standards	  of	  living	  to	  many	  throughout	  East	  
Asia.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Figure	  1.	  Real	  GDP	  Per	  Capita	  for	  Select	  East	  Asian	  Countries,	  1950-­‐2001	  
	  
Source:	  Angus	  Maddison,	  The	  World	  Economy,	  Historical	  Statistics	  (Paris:	  OECD,	  
2003)	  
While	  this	  form	  of	  development	  is	  theoretically	  sound	  in	  many	  ways,	  at	  its	  
core	  the	  model	  relies	  on	  keeping	  domestic	  prices	  (land,	  labor,	  and	  capital)	  growing	  
at	  rates	  lower	  than	  the	  total	  productivity	  of	  the	  economy.	  This	  ensures	  that	  goods	  
produced	  under	  domestic	  prices	  are	  structurally	  underpriced	  relative	  to	  their	  
international	  competition.126	  To	  accomplish	  this	  the	  domestic	  economy	  must	  
restrain	  household	  consumption	  in	  multiple	  ways.	  First,	  tariffs	  are	  typically	  utilized	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Steven Radelet, Jeffrey Sachs, Richard Cooper, and Barry Bosworth, “The East Asian 
Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies, Prospects” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 
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to	  artificially	  inflate	  the	  prices	  of	  foreign	  goods	  (while	  also	  serving	  to	  redirect	  
purchases	  toward	  domestic	  producers).	  Meanwhile,	  the	  state’s	  fiscal	  and	  monetary	  
policies	  are	  structured	  to	  punish	  consumption	  and	  promote	  industries	  associated	  
with	  coastal	  exports	  and	  fixed-­‐capital	  investment.	  These	  policies	  include	  
government	  regulated	  negative	  interest	  rates,	  the	  maintenance	  of	  a	  fundamentally	  
undervalued	  currency,	  subsidized	  loans	  to	  state-­‐operated	  firms,	  and	  tax	  subsidies	  
and	  credits	  for	  select	  industries.127	  As	  such,	  the	  system	  weighs	  heavily	  on	  the	  
domestic	  citizenry,	  requiring	  an	  ever-­‐increasing	  rural-­‐to-­‐urban	  migration	  to	  fuel	  
industrial	  production,	  while	  also	  requiring	  households	  to	  shoulder	  the	  implicit	  
subsidies	  that	  are	  required	  to	  maintain	  international	  competitiveness	  alongside	  
rising	  income	  and	  investment.	  
To	  accomplish	  this	  most	  nations	  that	  pursue	  a	  combination	  of	  export-­‐led	  
growth	  and	  import	  substitution	  tend	  to	  be	  relatively	  undemocratic.	  This	  can	  range	  
from	  a	  general	  political	  environment	  of	  single-­‐party	  dominance	  to	  outright	  
authoritarianism.	  However,	  the	  internal	  pressure	  that	  develops	  alongside	  rising	  
education	  levels	  (a	  prerequisite	  for	  higher	  technological	  productivity)	  and	  growing	  
incomes	  tends	  to	  mitigate	  this	  situation	  over	  time.	  This	  was	  certainly	  the	  case	  within	  
the	  East	  Asian	  economies	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  20th	  century.	  In	  fact,	  it	  was	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Thomas Palley, “The Rise and Fall of Export-led Growth,” Jerome Levy Economics Institute 
of Bard College, Paper 675 (2011), and Arslan Razmi and Gonzalo Hernandez, “Can Asia 
Sustain an Export-led Growth Strategy in the Aftermath of the Global Crisis? An Empirical 
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subsequent	  Asian	  financial	  crisis	  that	  proved	  to	  be	  the	  final	  political	  tipping	  point	  
for	  several	  of	  these	  countries.128	  
Still,	  economic	  factors	  tend	  to	  be	  the	  driving	  forces	  behind	  the	  development	  
of	  these	  economies,	  and	  the	  East	  Asian	  nations	  were	  no	  different.	  After	  a	  generation	  
of	  substantial	  growth	  and	  rising	  standards	  of	  living	  the	  Tiger	  Cubs	  became	  the	  
favorite	  investment	  destination	  of	  the	  large	  managed-­‐money	  funds	  that	  Minsky	  
frequently	  warned	  were	  coming	  to	  dominate	  international	  capital	  flows.	  
International	  banks	  and	  investment	  brokers	  began	  funneling	  incredible	  sums	  of	  
money	  into	  East	  Asian	  economies	  that	  were	  still	  comparatively	  small	  and	  
unprepared	  for	  the	  potentially	  harmful	  effects	  that	  could	  arise	  from	  a	  flood	  of	  
Western	  capital	  coming	  across	  their	  borders.129	  	  	  
	  
The	  “East	  Asian	  Miracle”	  and	  Minsky	  
The	  idea	  that	  an	  “Asian”	  financial	  crisis	  took	  place	  in	  1997-­‐98	  is	  a	  bit	  of	  a	  
misnomer,	  if	  not	  an	  outright	  mischaracterization	  of	  events.	  It	  is	  certainly	  true	  that	  
an	  economic	  tremor	  reverberated	  throughout	  the	  region,	  however;	  there	  was	  a	  wide	  
disparity	  between	  those	  nations	  most	  affected	  by	  the	  crisis	  and	  those	  who	  emerged	  
relatively	  unscathed.	  The	  former,	  specifically	  the	  nations	  of	  Indonesia,	  Malaysia,	  
South	  Korea,	  Thailand,	  and	  the	  Philippines,	  were	  highly	  vulnerable	  at	  the	  onset	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128See T.J. Pempel, ed., The Politics of the Asian Economic Crisis (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1999.), and Stephen Haggard, The Political Economy of the Asian Financial Crisis 
(Washington: Institute for International Economics, 2000). 
129 John Harvey, Currencies, Capital Flows, and Crises: A Post Keynesian Analysis of Exchange-
Rate Determination (Florence, Kentucky: Routledge, 2008). 
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the	  crisis	  due	  to	  the	  accumulated	  fragility	  within	  their	  respective	  financial	  systems.	  
This	  was	  the	  direct	  result	  of	  a	  prolonged	  process	  of	  accumulation	  built	  around	  
financial	  liberalization,	  and	  private	  investment	  cycles	  financed	  through	  increasingly	  
illiquid	  and	  short-­‐term	  foreign	  debt.	  The	  outcome	  was	  a	  cyclical	  boom	  of	  fixed-­‐
capital	  investment	  and	  asset	  price	  speculation,	  contributing	  to	  a	  steady	  surge	  in	  GDP,	  
as	  illustrated	  by	  Figure	  2.	  
Figure	  2.	  Asian	  Real	  GDP	  in	  the	  1990s	  as	  Indices	  (2005=100)
Source:	  International	  Financial	  Statistics	  Yearbook,	  IMF,	  (2000).	  
By	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  the	  aforementioned	  Asian	  countries	  were	  hastily	  
progressing	  through	  the	  economic	  liberalization	  programs	  designed	  for	  developing	  
economies	  that	  is	  collectively	  known	  as	  the	  Washington	  Consensus.130	  These	  
reforms	  included	  the	  deregulating	  of	  interest	  rates,	  the	  lowering	  of	  bank	  capital	  and	  
reserve	  requirements,	  the	  removal	  of	  capital	  controls,	  and	  the	  promotion	  of	  
financial	  innovation	  and	  the	  importing	  of	  Western	  financial	  products.	  As	  a	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consequence	  private	  sector	  financial	  institutions	  were	  able	  to	  import	  foreign	  
savings	  in	  order	  to	  help	  finance	  domestic	  investment-­‐driven	  asset	  booms.	  
Concurrently,	  foreign	  financial	  institutions	  were	  able	  to	  flood	  the	  Asian	  Tigers	  with	  
ever-­‐increasing	  amounts	  of	  short-­‐term	  and	  highly	  speculative	  money	  flows,	  
increasing	  financial	  volatility	  and	  driving	  further	  asset	  price	  spikes.	  The	  following	  
(Table	  1)	  illustrates	  both	  how	  commercial	  banks	  dominated	  the	  external	  financing	  
of	  these	  respective	  nations,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  sharp	  and	  severe	  reversal	  of	  money	  flows	  
that	  occurred	  at	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  crisis.	  
Table	  1.	  Total	  External	  Financing	  ($bn.)	  
	   1994	   1995	   1996	   1997	   1998	  
External	  financing,	  net	   47.4	   83.0	   99.0	   28.3	   -­‐4.2	  
Private	  flows,	  net	   40.5	   80.4	   102.3	   0.2	   -­‐27.6	  
Private	  creditors,	  net	   28.2	   65.1	   83.7	   -­‐4.2	   -­‐41.3	  
Commercial	  banks,	  net	   24	   53.2	   62.7	   -­‐21.2	   -­‐36.1	  
Non-­‐banks,	  net	   4.2	   12.0	   21.0	   17.1	   -­‐5.3	  
Official	  flows,	  net	   7	   2.6	   -­‐3.3	   28.1	   23.4	  
Currency	  reserves	  ex.	  Gold	  
(“-­‐“	  =	  An	  increase)	   -­‐5.4	   14.1	   16.9	   -­‐31.5	   42.1	  
Source:	  Capital	  Flows	  to	  Emerging	  Market	  Economies,	  IIF,	  (1999).	  
As	  a	  consequence	  of	  these	  rapid	  inflows	  of	  managed-­‐money	  the	  
comparatively	  small	  East	  Asian	  economies	  experienced	  large-­‐scale	  assets	  price	  
bubbles.	  As	  Minsky’s	  financial	  instability	  hypothesis	  predicts,	  surges	  in	  investment	  
inevitably	  lead	  to	  credit	  booms	  in	  capitalist	  economies	  with	  developed	  financial	  
structures,	  which	  in	  the	  modern	  world	  of	  free-­‐flowing	  capital	  and	  international	  
managed-­‐money	  funds	  encompasses	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  globe.	  In	  East	  Asia	  
foreign	  capital	  fueled	  the	  expansion	  of	  local	  bank	  credit	  at	  a	  spectacular	  rate.	  
	   64	  
Privatization	  and	  deregulation	  allowed	  profit-­‐seeking	  financial	  institutions	  to	  
extend	  local	  currency	  loans,	  financed	  through	  foreign-­‐denominated	  inflows,	  at	  a	  rate	  
that	  drove	  debt	  levels	  to	  increasingly	  larger	  percentages	  of	  the	  economy,	  as	  seen	  in	  
Table	  2.	  
Table	  2.	  Bank	  Lending	  to	  Private	  Sector	  as	  a	  Percentage	  of	  GDP	  
Year	   South	  Korea	   Indonesia	   Philippines	   Malaysia	   Thailand	  
1990	   52.5	   49.7	   19.2	   71.4	   64.3	  
1991	   52.8	   50.3	   17.8	   75.3	   67.7	  
1992	   53.3	   49.5	   20.4	   74.7	   74.2	  
1993	   54.2	   48.9	   26.4	   74.1	   80	  
1994	   56.9	   51.9	   29.1	   74.6	   91	  
1995	   61.8	   55.4	   49	   93.4	   102	  
1996	   69.8	   69.2	   56.5	   107	   116	  
Source:	  International	  Financial	  Statistics	  Yearbook,	  IMF,	  2000.	  
In	  East	  Asia	  this	  expansion	  led	  to	  large	  dislocations	  in	  domestic	  asset	  
markets.	  The	  capital	  gains	  of	  the	  day	  validated	  previous	  speculative	  investments	  
while	  easy	  credit	  and	  rising	  expectations	  drove	  the	  speculation	  of	  tomorrow.	  As	  
money-­‐managers	  flocked	  to	  the	  newest	  “paradigm-­‐shifting”	  market	  trend,	  rising	  
prices	  became	  self-­‐fulfilling	  as	  Keynes’	  animal	  spirits	  took	  over	  and	  fundamental	  
concepts	  of	  cash-­‐flow	  valuation	  and	  margins	  of	  safety	  were	  replaced	  by	  “greater	  fool	  
theory”	  speculation	  and	  mania.	  This	  trend	  is	  clearly	  visible	  in	  Figure	  3	  on	  the	  
following	  page,	  which	  highlights	  the	  absurd	  valuations	  that	  Asia’s	  domestic	  equity	  
markets	  were	  driven	  to	  at	  the	  height	  of	  the	  bubble.	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Figure	  3.	  P/E	  Ratios	  for	  Select	  Asian	  Countries,	  1990-­‐99	  
	  
Source:	  “Global	  Financial	  Data,”	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Global	  Financial	  Markets,	  7th	  Edition	  
(2000)	  http://www.globalfinancialdata.com.	  
	   As	  credit-­‐fueled	  speculation	  continued	  and	  assets	  prices	  surged	  the	  
international	  competiveness	  that	  was	  at	  the	  core	  of	  East	  Asia’s	  development	  model	  
was	  gradually	  eroded.	  Central	  banks	  were	  forced	  to	  keep	  interest	  rates	  high	  to	  
attract	  foreign	  capital	  for	  external	  debt	  payments,	  while	  currencies	  were	  artificially	  
inflated	  to	  protect	  domestic	  businesses	  from	  the	  potential	  revaluation	  of	  their	  
foreign	  debts.	  As	  a	  consequence	  the	  East	  Asian	  economies	  with	  the	  largest	  
speculative	  booms	  saw	  their	  balance	  of	  payments	  deteriorate.	  In	  order	  to	  continue	  
financing	  their	  investment-­‐driven	  growth	  strategies	  they	  needed	  to	  important	  
increasingly	  large	  amount	  of	  foreign	  capital.	  This	  dynamic	  is	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  4	  
on	  the	  following	  page,	  which	  shows	  the	  level	  of	  domestic	  investment	  in	  excess	  of	  
savings	  that	  was	  financed	  by	  external	  capital	  flows	  along	  with	  the	  resulting	  rise	  in	  
short-­‐term	  debt	  obligations	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  central	  bank	  reserves.	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Figure	  4.	  Foreign	  Capital,	  Domestic	  Investment,	  and	  FX	  Reserves	  
Source:	  International	  Financial	  Statistics	  Yearbook,	  IMF,	  2000.	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The	   private	   sector,	   largely	   financial	   institutions	   and	   commercial	   firms,	  
dominated	   this	   mania	   of	   overleveraging.	   Speculation	   in	   domestic	   real	   estate	   and	  
stock	  markets	  were	   the	  primary	   result	  of	   these	   large	   inflows	  of	   foreign	   capital.	   In	  
particular,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  domestic	  governments	  of	  East	  Asia	  were	  
entirely	  self-­‐financing	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  crisis.	  The	  governments	  of	  each	  of	  the	  five	  
countries	   that	   exhibited	   Minskian	   financial	   instability	   were	   running	   structural	  
budget	  surpluses	  and	  therefore	  had	  no	  need	  to	  import	  foreign	  capital	  for	  financing.	  
This	   fact	   is	   clearly	   illustrated	   in	   Figure	   5,	  which	   shows	   that	   all	   five	   nations	  were	  
running	  persistent	  government	  surpluses	  at	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  crisis.	  
Figure	  5.	  Government	  Balance	  as	  a	  Percentage	  of	  GDP	  
	  
Source:	  International	  Financial	  Statistics	  Yearbook,	  IMF,	  2000.	  
The	   rapid	   rise	   in	   external	   financing	   for	   the	   East	   Asian	   nations	  was	   further	  
aided	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  each	  of	  these	  respective	  countries	  was	  pegging	  its	  currency	  to	  
the	   US	   dollar	   ($).	   The	   central	   governments	   were	   effectively	   backstopping	   the	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of	   the	   currency	   peg,	   to	   ensure	   that	   foreign	   loans	   would	   not	   suffer	   from	   possible	  
exchange	   rate	   risks.	   If	   anything,	   the	   continual	   inflows	  of	   foreign	  currency	   through	  
the	  capital	  account	  were	  seen	  as	  a	  reliable	  source	  of	  upward	  pressure	  on	  the	  East	  
Asian	   currencies.	  Domestic	   businesses	  had	   every	   reason	   to	  believe	   they	  would	  be	  
paying	   back	   foreign	   loans	  with	   a	   stronger	   currency.	  While	   international	   investors	  
believed	   they	  would	   be	   reconverting	   their	   investments	   at	   a	   higher	   exchange	   rate,	  
adding	  gains	  from	  currency	  appreciation	  to	  their	  gains	  already	  reaped	  from	  higher	  
interest	  rates	  and	  booming	  asset	  prices.	  	  
The	   currency	   peg	   also	   provoked	   debt-­‐financed	   capital	   investment	   from	  
foreign	   loans	   by	   decreasing	   the	   amount	   of	   Keynesian	   uncertainty	   involved	   in	   the	  
financing	  process.	  By	  removing	  the	  specter	  of	  exchange-­‐rate	  risk	  from	  foreign	  debt	  
contracts	   national	   governments	   were	   providing	   the	   private	   sector	   with	   an	  
artificially	   high	   sense	   of	   security.	   They	   were	   encouraging	   the	   proliferation	   of	  
increasingly	   complex	   financial	   instruments	   and	   the	   buildup	   of	   growing	   levels	   of	  
fragility	   at	   the	   exact	   time	   they	   should	   have	   been	   reigning	   in	   these	   very	   activities.	  
The	   debt-­‐fueled	   expansion	   soon	   reached	   the	   point	   that	   even	   the	   historically	   high	  
growth	   rates	   experienced	   in	   these	   countries	   were	   not	   enough	   to	   stabilize	  
outstanding	  debt	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  the	  economy,	  as	  seen	  in	  Table	  3	  on	  the	  following	  
page.	  The	  end	  result	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  “financialization”	  is	  an	  increasingly	  large	  amount	  
of	   the	   national	   income	   is	   diverted	   to	   interest	   payments,	   in	   this	   case	   to	   foreign	  
lenders,	  and	  not	  into	  productive	  investment.	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Table	  3.	  Foreign	  Debt	  as	  a	  Percentage	  of	  GDP	  
Year	   South	  Korea	   Indonesia	   Philippines	   Malaysia	   Thailand	  
1990	   13.79	   65.89	   69.02	   35.8	   32.8	  
1991	   13.51	   68.21	   71.45	   35.48	   38.38	  
1992	   14.34	   68.74	   62.29	   34.51	   37.51	  
1993	   14.18	   56.44	   66.09	   40.74	   34.1	  
1994	   14.32	   60.96	   62.42	   40.4	   33.31	  
1995	   23.8	   61.54	   53.21	   39.31	   33.78	  
1996	   28.4	   56.74	   49.75	   40.06	   50.05	  
Source:	  International	  Financial	  Statistics	  Yearbook,	  IMF,	  2000.	  
The	   currency	   pegs	   also	   introduced	   a	   distinctly	   Minskian	   dynamic	   as	   well,	  
because	  pegging	  ones	  national	  currency	  to	  a	  foreign	  currency	  can	  only	  last	  as	  long	  
as	  the	  domestic	  central	  bank	  has	  the	  needed	  foreign	  exchange	  reserves	  to	  support	  
the	   national	   currency	   at	   the	   given	   exchange	   rate.	   In	   order	   to	   know	   if	   a	   domestic	  
central	   bank	   has	   the	   needed	   financial	   firepower	   to	   protect	   the	   peg	   one	   must	  
estimate	  the	  potential	  capital	  outflows	  that	  may	  need	  to	  be	  converted.	  A	  good	  proxy	  
for	  this	  estimation	  is	  the	  total	  level	  of	  short-­‐term	  debt	  within	  the	  domestic	  economy	  
that	   has	   been	   funded	   through	   external	   sources.	   These	   are	   loans	  maturing	   in	   less	  
than	  twelve	  months	  that,	  if	  not	  rolled	  over	  or	  refinanced	  domestically,	  will	  result	  in	  
capital	   outflows	   that	   will	   need	   to	   be	   cleared	   at	   the	   central	   bank	   at	   the	   given	  
exchange	  rate.	  	  
If	  private	  businesses	  operating	  within	  a	   fixed-­‐rate	  economy	  accumulate	   too	  
high	   a	   percentage	   of	   these	   foreign	   loans	   relative	   to	   the	   central	   bank’s	   foreign	  
exchange	   reserves	   they	   are	   effectively	   engaging	   in	   an	   international	   version	   of	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Minsky’s	   speculative	   finance.	   Just	   like	   the	   speculative	   borrowers	   who	   cannot	  
reasonably	   expect	   to	   pay	   the	   principal	   on	   their	   debts,	   these	   firms	   are	   entering	  
contracts	   that	   they	   cannot	   realistically	   repay	   at	   the	   contracted	   rate,	   as	   doing	   so	  
would	  drain	  the	  central	  bank’s	  reserves	  to	  an	  unacceptable	  level.	  Therefore,	  they	  are	  
dependent	   on	   continually	   rolling	   over	   their	   upcoming	   loans	   or	   refinancing	   them	  
with	   newly	   issued	   debt.	   This	  was	   clearly	   the	   case	   in	   East	  Asia	   at	   the	   onset	   of	   the	  
financial	  crisis,	  as	  illustrated	  in	  Table	  4.	  
Table	  4.	  Short-­‐term	  External	  Debt	  (June,	  1997,	  $bn.)	  
Country	   ST-­‐Debt	  to	  BIS	   Reserves	   Percent	  of	  
Reserves	  
South	  Korea	   70.2	   31.3	   224	  
Indonesia	   34.7	   18.9	   184	  
Thailand	   45.6	   37.7	   121	  
Philippines	   8.3	   9.4	   88	  
Malaysia	   16.3	   26.6	   61	  
Source:	  Capital	  Flows	  to	  Emerging	  Market	  Economies,	  IIF,	  (1999).	  
As	  assets	  prices	  rose,	  speculation	  ensued,	  and	  increasingly	  high	  amounts	  of	  
national	  income	  were	  diverted	  to	  paying	  foreign	  creditors	  and	  bidding	  up	  financial	  
shares.	  However,	  despite	  this	  increasingly	  fragile	  economic	  environment	  domestic	  
businesses	  were	  still	  taking	  out	  large	  foreign-­‐denominated	  debts.	  The	  perilous	  
currency	  pegs	  that	  were	  adopted	  only	  made	  these	  speculative	  financial	  endeavors	  
that	  much	  worse,	  as	  they	  exposed	  borrowers	  to	  high	  levels	  of	  foreign	  exchange	  risk,	  
on	  top	  of	  the	  leverage	  risk	  of	  the	  debt	  itself,	  and	  the	  general	  operating	  risk	  involved	  
in	  managing	  a	  firm	  within	  an	  investment	  mania.	  Eventually	  the	  self-­‐reinforcing	  
credit	  mechanism	  that	  both	  Minsky	  and	  Kindleberger	  highlighted	  as	  a	  driving	  force	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of	  economic	  bubbles	  had	  finally	  reached	  a	  level	  of	  instability	  that	  could	  not	  be	  
sustained.	  	  
Beginning	  in	  Thailand	  in	  mid-­‐1997	  and	  soon	  spreading	  throughout	  the	  
region,	  a	  financial	  panic	  engulfed	  East	  Asia	  as	  asset	  prices	  plunged.	  Managed-­‐money	  
funds	  began	  pulling	  short-­‐term	  credit	  out	  of	  the	  region	  while	  simultaneously	  selling	  
domestic	  securities.	  The	  pressure	  on	  central	  banks	  eventually	  lead	  to	  large-­‐scale	  
devaluations,	  as	  foreign	  exchange	  reserves	  could	  not	  meet	  the	  demand	  for	  outflows	  
from	  speculators	  and	  the	  alternative	  measure	  of	  higher	  interest	  rates	  was	  
destroying	  domestic	  demand.	  When	  combined	  with	  falling	  asset	  prices	  theses	  
devaluations	  led	  to	  further	  defaults	  within	  the	  East	  Asian	  economies.	  The	  same	  self-­‐
perpetuating	  credit	  cycle	  that	  inflated	  the	  financial	  bubble,	  once	  reversed,	  led	  to	  its	  
ultimate	  collapse.	  As	  illustrated	  in	  Table	  4	  on	  the	  following	  page,	  the	  simultaneous	  
shocks	  experienced	  within	  the	  stock,	  bond,	  and	  currency	  markets	  within	  these	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Table	  5.	  The	  Collapse	  
	   3-­‐Month	  Interest	  Rates	  
Real	  Dollar	  Ex.	  
Rate	  Change	  








Date	  of	  97’	  
Peak	  
S.	  Korea	   13.3%	   25%	   October	   -­‐33.8%	   -­‐42.6%	  
Indonesia	   13.8%	   27.7%	   October	   -­‐77.7%	   -­‐37%	  
Thailand	   13%	   26%	   December	   -­‐36.7%	   -­‐55.2%	  
Philippines	   11.7%	   85%	   October	   -­‐38.3%	   -­‐40.3%	  
Malaysia	   7.3%	   8.8%	   November	   -­‐39.8%	   -­‐52.2%	  
Source:	  68th	  Annual	  Report,	  The	  Bank	  of	  International	  Settlements,	  1998	  and	  
International	  Financial	  Statistics	  Yearbook,	  IMF,	  2000.	  
The	  quantitative	  overview	  provided	  within	  this	  data	  reinforces	  the	  Minskian	  
nature	  of	  the	  Asian	  economies,	  the	  underlying	  weaknesses	  of	  these	  economies	  in	  
historical	  terms,	  and	  the	  overleveraging	  of	  the	  1990s	  in	  particular.	  Some,	  like	  
Indonesia	  or	  the	  Philippines,	  were	  less	  developed	  by	  the	  time	  of	  the	  crisis,	  and	  were	  
a	  bit	  less	  influenced	  by	  it	  (although	  the	  political	  ramifications	  were	  severe),	  whereas	  
others,	  like	  South	  Korea,	  were	  already	  so	  developed	  and	  relatively	  stable	  politically	  
that	  they	  did	  not	  suffer	  long	  lasting	  aftereffects	  of	  the	  crisis.	  It	  seems	  that	  the	  
countries	  that	  were	  most	  impacted	  by	  the	  crisis	  were	  those	  in	  the	  “middle	  of	  the	  
pack,”	  like	  Thailand	  and	  Malaysia,	  who	  were	  the	  most	  prone	  to	  overleveraging	  in	  the	  
1990s	  and	  also	  felt	  the	  crisis	  the	  deepest.	  One	  could	  argue	  that	  modern	  capitalist	  
economies,	  and	  perhaps	  especially	  those	  that	  are	  rapidly	  developing	  by	  more	  
intense	  utilization	  of	  economic	  resources,	  are	  indeed	  prone	  to	  financial	  instability	  
and	  business	  cycles,	  despite	  Keynesian	  and	  monetarist	  ideas	  alike.	  Beneath	  the	  
	   73	  
veneer	  of	  unparalleled	  economic	  growth	  the	  Asian	  economies	  were	  becoming	  
increasingly	  unstable	  in	  the	  1990s,	  until	  the	  bubble	  finally	  burst.	  They	  exploited	  
artificially	  cheap	  foreign	  debt	  and	  government	  subsidized	  domestic	  lending	  to	  fuel	  
increasingly	  speculative	  investments	  that	  were	  only	  deemed	  rational	  through	  the	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CONCLUSION	  
Minsky’s	  financial	  instability	  hypothesis	  provides	  a	  timely	  theoretical	  
framework	  for	  examining	  the	  recent	  bout	  of	  financial	  crises	  that	  have	  plagued	  the	  
global	  economy	  after	  the	  abrupt	  ending	  of	  the	  Great	  Moderation.	  Specifically,	  this	  
thesis	  applies	  Minsky’s	  theoretical	  framework	  to	  the	  Asian	  financial	  crisis	  of	  1997,	  
and	  argues	  that	  it	  was	  largely	  investment-­‐driven	  growth,	  financed	  through	  
increasingly	  speculative	  methods,	  that	  led	  to	  the	  accumulated	  economic	  fragility	  and	  
asset	  bubbles	  that	  were	  the	  eventual	  downfall	  of	  the	  high-­‐flying	  economies	  of	  East	  
Asia.	  Consequently,	  the	  crisis	  provides	  a	  clear	  prism	  through	  which	  we	  can	  better	  
analyze	  both	  the	  contributing	  and	  perpetuating	  factors	  of	  a	  Minskian	  collapse.	  	  	  	  
The	  Asian	  financial	  crisis	  exhibited	  all	  of	  the	  classic	  signs	  of	  a	  credit-­‐driven	  
financial	  bubble.	  From	  unrestrained	  optimism	  on	  behalf	  of	  investors	  to	  rising	  
leverage	  within	  domestic	  firms	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  East	  Asian	  crisis	  was	  yet	  another	  
example	  of	  the	  trend	  identified	  by	  Kindleberger	  decades	  ago,	  namely,	  that	  capitalist	  
economies	  with	  profit-­‐seeking	  firms	  and	  unrestrained	  banking	  systems	  have	  an	  
incredible	  propensity	  toward	  financial	  instability	  and	  subsequent	  crisis.	  Thus,	  it	  is	  
vital	  that	  both	  economists	  and	  economic	  historians	  alike	  work	  to	  rediscover	  the	  
works	  Minsky	  as	  a	  means	  of	  better	  investigation	  and	  analysis	  of	  both	  modern	  and	  
historical	  capitalism.	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There	  are	  obvious	  avenues	  for	  further	  research	  that	  could	  be	  highly	  
rewarding	  for	  the	  economic	  historian	  with	  a	  solid	  grasp	  on	  both	  Minsky’s	  theory,	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  aforementioned	  economists	  and	  political	  theorists	  who	  influenced	  him.	  
Both	  the	  Great	  Depression	  and	  the	  panic	  of	  1907	  offer	  tantalizing	  possibilities	  for	  
the	  application	  of	  a	  Minskian	  framework,	  particularly	  considering	  the	  relative	  rise	  of	  
finance	  capital	  in	  the	  preceding	  years	  of	  both	  events.	  The	  panic	  of	  1873	  and	  
subsequent	  Long	  Depression	  also	  appears	  to	  be	  fertile	  ground.	  This	  is	  due	  primarily	  
to	  the	  prominent	  role	  played	  by	  post-­‐Civil	  War	  speculation	  and	  the	  early	  rise	  of	  
finance	  capitalism	  that	  coincided	  with	  the	  surge	  in	  capital	  investment	  that	  drove	  the	  
railroad	  expansion.	  	  	  	  	  
However,	  the	  clearest	  examples	  of	  Minskian	  financial	  panics	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  
the	  wave	  of	  manias	  and	  crashes	  that	  have	  plagued	  developed	  and	  emerging	  
economies	  alike	  in	  the	  post-­‐Bretton	  Woods	  era.	  Indeed,	  Minsky’s	  prescient	  thoughts	  
on	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  financial	  sector	  and	  the	  inevitability	  of	  more	  recurrent	  financial	  
crises	  should	  provide	  a	  strong	  impetus	  for	  economic	  historians	  to	  seek	  out	  further	  
applications	  for	  his	  work	  in	  the	  litany	  of	  recent	  crises.	  For	  example,	  the	  Asian	  
financial	  crisis	  was	  not	  by	  any	  means	  a	  singular	  event.	  Within	  a	  year	  of	  East	  Asia’s	  
collapse	  financial	  turmoil	  spread	  across	  the	  globe:	  to	  Russia	  in	  1998,	  then	  to	  
Argentina	  in	  1999,	  and	  finally	  to	  America	  with	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  NASDAQ	  bubble	  in	  
2000.	  While	  there	  are	  many	  factors	  that	  differentiate	  these	  events	  there	  is	  also	  an	  
underlying	  economic	  framework	  binding	  them	  together	  that	  centers	  around	  free-­‐
flowing	  international	  capital,	  the	  rise	  of	  managed-­‐money	  and	  concentrated	  pools	  of	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investment	  funds,	  and	  the	  increasingly	  prominent	  role	  of	  financial	  institutions	  in	  the	  
business	  cycle.	  	  	  
Therefore,	  it	  seems	  imprudent	  for	  an	  economic	  historian,	  particularly	  one	  
versed	  in	  the	  works	  of	  Kindleberger,	  to	  dismiss	  the	  idea	  that	  these	  events	  could	  
share	  a	  common	  underpinning.	  Economic	  historians	  must	  remain	  open	  to	  the	  
possibility	  of	  new	  or	  rediscovered	  analytical	  tools	  that	  can	  help	  better	  elucidate	  the	  
recent	  turmoil	  that	  seems	  to	  have	  engulfed	  the	  global	  economy.	  The	  field	  must	  
continually	  reappraise	  and	  reexamine	  past	  theories	  in	  the	  light	  of	  new	  
developments.	  In	  particular,	  the	  work	  of	  Minsky	  must	  be	  brought	  into	  the	  
mainstream	  discussion	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  timely	  and	  credible	  opposition	  to	  the	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